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It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a
great anthropological document.'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL CuLTuRE TODAY
Now, perhaps more than at any other time in the history of American
legal culture, we may be in a position to grasp the importance of Holmes's
words, for we are living in the postmodern era. We are now privy to the
growing realization that a cultural threshold has been crossed. The way we
understand ourselves and the world that we live in has undergone
significant change. And because law is both a by-product and a co-
producer of mainstream culture, those of us who are concerned about law
and its practices are bound to feel the need to come to grips with the
change that has taken place.
This article presents a general overview of what has become an
increasingly influential convergence of ideas within the current culture.
The overview suggests that adjusting our sights to this new cultural terrain
makes possible important shifts in our outlook toward legal theory, legal
practice, and legal pedagogy. My main purpose here is to describe that
terrain and to suggest why it invites a new look at what the law is and
where it is to be found. My hope is that this effort will help to set the
stage for the kinds of concrete studies that I and others believe can come
of a lawyering-theory approach. The youngest fruits of this approach may
be tasted (and tested) in the sampling of articles that follow this one.
These articles are meant to be illustrative, marking perhaps the beginning
of a more extensive effort to produce a broad range of similar micro-
analytical lawyering case studies.
To understand our current situation, I believe it will be useful at the
outset to reflect a bit on where we have come from and why we are now
encountering the divisiveness and tensions that have been hectoring legal
academia from within and straining its relationship with practitioners,
judges, and the public at large.2 Along the way, we must also be attentive
1. OLIVER W. HoLMEs, Law in Science and Science in Law, in CoLLECDT LEGAL
PAPERS 210, 212 (1920).
2. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education,
35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 87, 92-93 (1990):
American law schools are still caught astride a chasm that separates the Scylla
of the academic university from the Charybdis of the practicing
profession.. . . American law faculty have long been caught between the
demands created by the seeming incompatibility of the basic visions and
functions of the university and those of educating aspiring lawyers.
Id.; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992) (expressing the "fear that our law schools
and law firms are moving in opposite directions"); Robert C. Post, Legal Scholarship
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to what the experts and the lay public believe about law and the legal
process and what can no longer be believed. In the course of these
inquiries, we shall be taking a closer look at the ways in which meanings
are made in everyday legal practices-in courts, law offices, government
agencies, and elsewhere. How are these meanings transmitted from one
generation to the next and from one concrete legal context to the next in
our own time? What are the symbolic forms, the inherited
conceptualizations, and the attitudes, feelings, and beliefs by which
lawyers and scholars, judges and legislators, law clerks and lay folk
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their understanding of the law and
its practices? Our focus, in short, is on the legal culture.'
As it turns out, the current era is especially felicitous to such cultural
studies. For example, we are now witnessing in a variety of fields a
marked sensitivity to diverse ways of thinking and talking about what we
know and who we are.4 This approach invites us to explore the different
and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 615, 615 (1992) ("Very few academics
today doubt that American legal scholarship is experiencing a crisis of identity. ... We
are in danger of dissipating our coherence as a professional discipline."); Behind the Bar,
CONN. L. TRiB., May 18, 1992, at 17 ("The Wall Street Journal lambasted Senate
majority leader George Mitchell for attempting to use Senate procedure to thwart what
it called 'the first Senate vote since 1986 on reforming America's runaway legal system
.... '"); Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 62-64
(citing a sharp decline of public confidencein lawyers and assailing law schools for doing
an inadequate job of training law graduates in trial-advocacy skills); Henry Rose, Law
Schools Are Failing to Teach Students to Do Good, Cm!. TRm., July 11, 1990, § 1, at
17 ("American law schools are losing their souls. Entering the 1990s, the primary
function of legal education in America is to train students to serve affluent people and
business interests. At the same time, 85% of Americans cannot afford the services of an
attorney."); Benjamin Sells, The Lawyer as Mouthpiece, ILL. LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 1992,
at 32 ("Unfortunately, the current resurgence of 'lawyer bashing' leads many lawyers to
circle the wagons and withdraw within the relative security of personal isolation.").
3. See CLIFFORD GBBRTZ, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION
OF CULTURES 87, 89 (1973).
4. For example, by shifting away from the self-conscious self as the starting point
for knowledge-a point that can be located in Descartes' cogito ergo sum ("I think,
therefore I am") and that culminated in Hegel's absolute subject-the phenomenological
tradition and its offshoots opened the way to a new epistemology. In lieu of seeking
universal criteria for certainty, thinkers such as Nietzsche, Schutz, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, Gadamer, Foucault, Ricoeur, and Bourdieu have focused a good deal of their
attention upon the complex structure of human understanding, the shifting social and
historical frameworks for cognition, and the multiplicity of contexts in which common
sense constructs meaning and reality.
For an excellent analysis of the postmodemlphenomenological connection, see
GIANNI VATrIMo, THE END OF MODERNrIY 10-12 (Jon R. Synder trans., Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1988) (1985). For important insights concerning the new epistemological
1992]
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ways in which our use of language-whether in everyday discourse or in
technical narratives-makes meaning and judgment possible. Cognitive
psychologist Jerome Bruner has recently observed that there is a natural
human push or "readiness," from quite early on, to "organize experience
narratively." 5 In this view, the stories young children hear from their
parents and others are no mere diversions. These stories lay down the
basic tools by which we organize our experience and our memory of
human events.6 How humans act in the world on the basis of their beliefs
and desires, how they strive to achieve particular goals, how they meet
and overcome obstacles, all this, set in a discretely structured sequence in
time, is conveyed by narrative.7
status of rhetoric, see HANS-GEORO GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 414-15 (Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed., Crossroad Publishing Corp. 1990)
(1960); HERBERT W. SIMONS, THE RHETORICAL TURN 2 (1990); Michael J. Hyde &
Craig R. Smith, Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved Relationship, 65
Q.J. SPEECH 347, 347 (1979).
5. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 34-35, 45, 80-81 (1990).
6. See Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Realiy, CRITICAL INQUIRY,
Autumn 1991, at 1, 4; see also JUDY DUNN, THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL
UNDERsTANDING 141-48 (1988); NARRATIVES FROM Tim CRIB 62-63 (Katherine Nelson
ed., 1989); RUTH WEIR, LANGUAGE IN THE CRIB 144-45 (1962); E. Ochs Keenan,
Conversational Competence in Children, in ACQUIRING CONVERSATIONAL COMPETENCE
3, 3-25 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992). In their pathbreaking study,
the authors describe how two opposing attorneys in a criminal case constructed different
realities by deploying two sharply contrasting stories: one in which jurors were cast in
the role of the "Quest Hero" and one in which they were cast as "seekers of the truth."
In Amsterdam and Hertz's words, "[t]he lawyer's power to create his or her chosen tale
is exercised, and its exercises can be detected, largely in terms of language structuring.
Much of what a jury argument says is conveyed by implicit narrative and dialogic
structure and by linguistic microstructure." Id. at 58; see also JOHN M. CONLEY &
WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS, at ix (1990) (describing two
different genres of storytelling in typical small claims court proceedings-one oriented
to rules and principles, the other, which fared poorly in court, displaying what the
authors call a "relational orientation," i.e., a narrative that reflects personal and social
wrongs undergirded by a strong sense of social interdependence).
For other discussions of the properties of narrative, see BRUNER, supra note 5;
KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (Univ. of Cal. Press 1969) (1945); STEVEN
COHAN & LINDA M. SHIRES, TELLING STORIES (1988); ALGIRDAS J. GREIMAS, ON
MEANING (Wlad Godzich & Jochen Schulte-Sasse eds. & Paul J. Peron & Frank H.
Collins trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1987) (1983); VLADIMIR PROPp, MORPHOLOGY OF
THE FOLKTALE (Louis A. Wagner ed. & Lawrence Scott trans., 2d ed., Univ. of Tex.
Press 1968) (1928); PAUL RICOEUR, OF TIME AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen McLaughlin
& David Pallauer trans., 1984); THEODORE R. SARBN, NARRATIvE PSYCHOLOGY
[Vol. 37
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The attention now being paid in diverse quarters to the different ways
in which meaning and reality are narratively constructed marks a rather
sharp break with the modernist view that the mind consists of "natural"
rational categories. 8 The consequences of this shift are significant. For
example, the move from a "logical" to a narratival organization of mind
holds out- a version of reality whose acceptability is governed not by
empirical verification and logical soundness, but rather by social
convention and "narrative necessity. "' In this respect, one might say that
(1986); Bruner, supra note 6.
8. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQuE OF PURE REASON, at A139, A313, B177, B370
(Norman K. Smith trans., 1965) (noting that "subsumption," the ability to bring
experience under concepts ofjudgment, is the way we acquire knowledge); JEAN PIAGET,
THE CONsTRUCrION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD, at xi-xiii (Margaret Cook trans., 1954)
(describing a natural sequence of psychological stages of human development); 1
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PIMOsOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 16 (1981) (adding
further stages to Piaget's developmental hierarchy).
Similar "objectivist" tendencies can be found in structural anthropology, see
CLAUDE LftVI-STRAuss, THE SAvAGE MIND (George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. 1966)
(1962), structural linguistics, see Jerrold Katz & Jerry Fodor, The Structure of Semantic
Theory, 39 LANGUAGE 170, 170 (1963), and formalist philosophy, see LUDWIG
WTTeENsTEIN, TRACTATUS LoGIco-PHILosopImcus 3-4 (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuinness trans., 1974). See generally CULTURE THEORY (Richard A. Shweder &
Robert A. LeVine eds., 1984) (discussing social scientists' characteristic preference, at
least until very recently, for research studies that seek out universals and/or automatic
processes and that aspire to quantified findings).
9. Bruner, supra note 6, at 4. See generally THOMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF ScIENTmIc REVoLuTIoNS 94 (2d ed. 1970) ("Mhe choice ... between competing
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life"). As
Gianni Vattimo aptly notes, Kuhn's approach to scientific revolutions can be understood
as a reduction of scientific logic to rhetoric in that scientific theories now come to be
viewed as demonstrable only from within paradigms, which, in turn, are not "logically"
verifiable, but are accepted on the basis of "a rhetorical kind of persuasiveness."
VATrIMO, supra note 4, at 137. Hermeneutics similarly places human knowledge and
truth within a distinctly sociolinguistic ("form of life") context. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, supra note 4, at 414 (noting that language is not so much something the
individual speaks as that which speaks the individual); VATTIMO, supra note 4, at 133
(noting that the logos, rather than attaining to universal truth, as is the case in the
Cartesian/European Enlightenment view, is a form of social understanding in the finite
and highly contextualized discourse of historical human beings) (citing GADANER, supra
note 4, at 497-98); see also DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL
TRUTH 135 (1984) ("[O]nce we have chosen a particular construction, we have fixed, in
language, the form of the event we are seeking; the words define the object (and
frequently the outcome) of our search."); BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND
NARRATIVE COHERENCE 10-11, 27-30, 58-60 (1988) (describing the Greimasian school
of semiotics as a "non-referential" approach to narrative in contrast to the Legal Realists'
conventional representation).
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the better our understanding of how stories inform and captivate belief, the
better our understanding will be of how particular constructions of reality
gain ascendancy (or lose it) in particular contexts in particular cultures at
a given point in time."°
This perspective also casts a different light on the value of subjects
like interpretation theory, literary criticism, sociolinguistics, cognitive
psychology, and cultural anthropology. For these fields may now be seen
as leading us into a domain once claimed as the sole province of
philosophy, where metaphysicians and epistemologists ask: What is real,
and what constitutes knowledge? The shift to narrative (the so-called
"interpretive turn") is now directing us to new sources of knowledge not
only about the different ways in which we experience ourselves, others,
and the social and natural world around us, but also about the nature of
the human mind, how it operates in the construction of meaning and
In the nonreferential view, meaning in narrative is independent of any necessary
relationship with the outside world but is still analyzable within a particular framework
of signification. The latter framework is based on the coherence of language in use
(pragmatics), not on objective or universal properties of languageper so. The affinity that
has been discerned of late between pragmatic philosophy, Wittgenstein's later writings,
and the work of Martin Heidegger reflects this general epistemological shift to a non-
referential/non-Cartesian view of meaning and truth. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 7, 125-27 (1979) (discussing the differences
between seventeenth-century notions of knowledge and the epistemologies of
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey); Dennis Patterson, PostmodernismlFeminism/Law,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 273 (1992) (claiming that postmodernism "replaces the
modernist picture of Sentence-Truth-World with an account of understanding that
emphasizes practice, warranted assertability, and pragmatism").
10. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic Tort Law:
Three OverarchingMetaphors and Three Sources ofLaw, 26 VAL. U. L. Rlv. 795,797-
99 (1992) (describing the structure and development of toxic tort law in late twentieth
century American culture based on the interaction of three overarching metaphors: "a
morality play," "a town meeting," and "a public lecture"); Kenneth Gergen, The
Checkmate of Rhetoric (But Can Our Reasons Become Causes?), in THE RHETORICAL
TURN: INVENTION AND PERSUASION ON THE CONDUCr OF INQUIRY 292, 303 (1990).
Gergen writes:
To the extent that any given paradigm gains adherents to its discursive
procedures and related practices, it may be said to generate enclaves of power.
That is, the reigning system of intelligibility promotes certain patterns of
organized social action and at the same time forbids or discourages a range of
competitors. In effect, each paradigm operates simultaneously as a productive
and repressive force.
Id.; see also Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields
in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 729,733 (1988) (making a point similar
to Gergen's regarding the distribution of knowledge and power in the legal culture based
on historically dominant forms of legal discourse).
[Vol. 37
9]L4WYERIG THEORY OVERVIEW
reality," and how social and cultural forms of expression help determine
the way we think, speak, and feel about events in the world.12
To proceed in this fashion tracks a number of contemporary themes.
For example, postmodernists have persistently sought to undercut the
modernist faith in an objective reality that is "out there" and that can be
reliably known were we but to get our method of analysis right.13
Similarly, we are witnessing growing skepticism toward the modernist
belief in universal reason: that supposedly unchanging source of absolute
11. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 33; Bruner, supra note 6, at 5-6; John M. Conley
et al., The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1375, 1395 (1990); see also RICHARD A. SHwEDER, THN3N THROUGH CuLTuRES 1-2
(1991) (discussing the process of "thinking through" cultures "by means of the other"
[as an expert in some realm of human experience], "by getting the other straight"
[rational reconstruction of the other's beliefs and practices], "by deconstructing and going
right through and beyond the other" [revealing what the other has suppressed], and
"witnessing in the context of engagement with the other" [revealing one's own
perspective on things]); EVESWETSER, FROM ETYMOLOGY TO PRAGMATICS 1-13 (1991)
(reflecting the shift to a narrative-based or non-representational construction of meaning
and reality). Lev Semenovich Vygotsky was an early pioneer in seeking out the
interrelationships among language, culture, and cognition. See JAMES V. WERTSCH,
VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND 133 (1985).
12. For one thing, this view puts pressure on the familiar Western liberal ideal of
the "autonomous" self. In light of current knowledge in cultural and cognitive
pyschology and sociolinguistics, it becomes more and more difficult to separate out
individual "mind" and collective "culture." Developments in these and related fields also
vex the modernist aspiration to organize knowledge into ever-expanding rational systems.
Once we recognize the social and metaphoric construction of knowledge, it becomes
increasingly apparent that there are discrete and incommensurable forms of knowledge
and discourse at the local level that will not simply meld together. In view of this
pluralistic reality, choosing a dominant form of "power talk" may invite an enhanced
appreciation of the consequences of such choices for "non-dominant" discourse
communities. See Pierre Schag, A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1195,
1208 (1989) ("In part, misunderstandings arise not only because the conversants are not
operating within the same cognitive frameworks but also because they are not aware that
they are not operating within the same cognitive frameworks."); see also SHWEDER,
supra note 11, at 148 (observing that "the metaphors by which people live and the world
views to which they subscribe mediate the relationship between what one thinks about
how one thinks."); Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law.: Toward a Sociology of the
Judicial Field, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 805, 838 (1987):
Law is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates
the things named, and creates social groups in particular. It confers upon the
reality which arises from its classificatory operations the maximum
permanence that any social entity has the power to confer upon another, the
permanence which we attribute to objects.
Id.
13. See, e.g., RORTY, supra note 9.
19921
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and enduring categories of knowing. 4 In addition, for better or worse,
there has been continued erosion in the modernist belief in a unitary,
stable self.15 Freud and his followers were early pioneers in that
effort.1
6
As part of the current shift away from the modernist frame for mind
and reality, instead of concentrating on rational methods or objective
categories, contemporary humanities scholars and social scientists are
increasingly focusing upon how meanings are created, preserved, and
altered over time and in different contexts. It is no longer taken for
14. See, e.g., RICHARD 1. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBjECTiVISM AND RELATIVISM 8-9
(1983) ("The concept of rationality . . . must be understood as relative to a specific
conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture");
C.f ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 6 (1951) ("The
eighteenth century is imbued with a belief in the unity and immutability of reason.
Reason is the same for all thinking subjects, all nations, all epochs, and all cultures.").
15. See, e.g., COHAN & SHIRES, supra note 7, at 149 ("The subject, continually
(re)activated and (re)positioned in the multiple discourses of culture, is an effect of
signification."); see also BRUNER, supra note 5, at 20-21 ("[C]ulture and the quest for
meaning within culture are the proper causes of human action. The biological substrate,
the so-called universals of human nature, is not a cause of action but, at most, a
constraint upon it or a condition for it."); Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences
of Man, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15, 40 (1985) (stating that "we
are aware of the world through a 'we' before we are through an 'I'").
16. See SIGMUND FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECrURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 22
(James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1966) (1920) (Psychoanalysis
"defines what is mental as processes such as feeling, thinking and willing, and it is
obliged to maintain that there is unconscious thinking and unapprehended willing.");
Marcia Cavell, Interpretation, Psychoanalysis, and the Philosophy of Mind, 36 J. AM.
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 859, 860 (1988) (describing Freud's model of mind, according
to which "the meaning of a thought or utterance is not the exclusive property, so to
speak, of the thinker," given that "mind is inherently interpersonal in its very structure
(as in the claim of the Oedipal theory that identifications with others play a central role
in forming... the values of any individual)"); see also JACQUES A. LACAN, ECRrrS:
A SELECTION 165 (Alan Sheridan tians., 1977) ("It is not a question of knowing whether
I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather of knowing whether
I am the same as that of which I speak."); JACQUES A. LACAN, THE FOUR
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTs OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 211 (Jacques-Aain Miller ed. & Alan
Sheridan trans., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1978) (1973) (noting that the subject gains
meaning in language only at the expense of being: "If we choose being, the subject
disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non-meaning. If we choose meaning, the meaning
survives only deprived of that part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that which
constitutues in the realization of the subject, the unconscious."); COLIN MACCABE,
TRACKING THE SIGNIFIER 65 (1985) ("As speaking subjects we constantly oscillate
between the symbolic and the imaginary-constantly imagining ourselves granting some
full meaning to the words we speak, and constantly being surprised to find them
determined by relations outside our control.").
[Vol. 37
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granted that familiar canons of logic will suffice for argument's sake.
Indeed, there is now under way a broad-based effort to explore new
canons and multiple "logics"' -like the logic of common sense,"
desire,"' or discrete comprehensive systems,' as well as the logic of
17. See, e.g., Herbert W. Simons, The Rhetoric of Inquiry as an Intellectual
Movement, in THE RHETOPJCAL TURN, INVENTION AND PERSUASION ON THE CONDUCT
OF INQUIRY 1, 2 (1990). According to Simons:
In place of covering laws, there is talk of contingent, historically situated
truths, reflective of values and interests, and found more or less useful by
cultures and communities which are themselves symbolically constituted. And
there are faint suspicions that scholarly communities are no less influenced by
"fuzzy" logics than by formal, deductive, "close-fisted" logics; by arguments
from sign and analogy; by anecdotes and exemplars; and even by appeals to
authority, tradition, convention, intuition, and aesthetic goodness-of-fit.
Id.; see also Robert A. LeVine, Properties of Culture: An Ethnographic View, in
CULTURE THEORY, supra note 8, at 76-84 (stating that it is only by constantly switching
frames that we honor the multiplex world); Richard A. Shweder, DivergentRationalities,
in METATHEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 163, 180 (Donald W. Fiske & Richard A. Shweder
eds., 1986) (considering a third logic of "divergent rationality" to process subjective
experience); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M, Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REv.
509, 513 (1992):
The printed page-with its unchanging form, linear structure, and conceptual
abstractions amenable to rational processing-reduces and frames the context
of "reality" in a manner that effectuates the rule of law. In the electronic
world, however, text and context are preserved and replayed as never before.
Paratexts release legal reality from the confines of the printed page by
representing more fully the oral dimensions of legal events and by introducing
their visual element. As a result, paratexts enframe legal reality by throwing
unruly context in text, thereby particularizing our legal experience.
Id.; Nelson Goodman, Notes on the Well-made World, 51 PARTISAN REv. 274, 276
(1984) ("[O]ne might say that there is only one world, but this holds true for each of the
many worlds."). See generally FRANCO FERRAROTrI, THE END OF CONVERSATION
(1988) (noting that each new medium of communication is a result of institutional
developments, popular reactions, and cultural forces).
18. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCALKNOWLEDGE 76 (1983) (observing that
"if common sense is as much an interpretation of the immediacies of experience, a gloss
on them, as are myth, painting, epistemology, or whatever, then it is, like them,
historically constructed and, like them, subjected to historically defined standards of
judgment"); Sherwin, supra note 10, at 737-39 (describing multiple forms of common
sense).
19. See generally Roy D'Andrade, A Folk Model of the Mind, in CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 112, 120-27 (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn
eds., 1989) [hereinafter CULTURAL MODELS] (discussing the connection between feelings
and desires and the means-end relation between intentions and wishes).
20. For example, in linguistic theory, see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 22-24 (1980); SWEETSER, supra note 11, at 1-13. Pertinent
1992l
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certain non-systematizable situations involving particular parties and
particular texts that are invoked and interpretatively applied to provide
mutually acceptable resolutions to specific conflicts.21
In sum, the narratival approach that I have been describing builds on
a basic and far-reaching insight. It tells us that while a great deal of order
may exist in the reality we experience, much of the order we perceive is
there only because we put it there." We are only just beginning to
realize how much of our knowledge and daily practices acquire and
maintain their present form by the force of underlying cultural models that
we have created by social agreement.' By this dispensation, all social
developments in sociology, media genretheory, and legal theory may also be noted here.
See Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling. The Differentiation
of the Legal System, 13 CARIzO L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1992) (defining autonomous
systems); S.J. Schmidt, Towards A Constructivist Theory of Media Genre, 16 PoETIcS
371, 373-76 (1987) (describing how genre concepts and their communicative labels
govern the cognitive operations of actors in and by the media); Gunther Teubner, How
the Law Thinks: Toward A Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
727, 745 (1989) (claiming that "L1]aw is forced to produce an autonomous legal reality
and cannot at the same time immunize itself against conflicting realities produced by
other discourses in society").
21. See, e.g., GADANER, supra note 4, at 394:
The organisation of words and things, that is undertaken by each language in
its own way, always constitutes a primary natural formation of concepts that
is a long way from the system of the scientific formation of concepts. It
follows entirely the human aspect of things, the system of man's needs and
interests. What a linguistic commmunity regards as important about a thing can
be given a common name with other things that are perhaps of a quite different
nature in other respects, so long as they all have the same quality that is
important to the community.
Id.; see also NATALIE Z. DAVIS, FICTIoN IN THE ARcHIvES 16-18 (1987) (noting a
discrete repertoire of narratival sources that shaped and informed the legal discourse of
the time).
22. Naomi Quinn & Dorothy Holland, Culture and Cognition, in CULTURAL
MODELS, supra note 19, at 3; see also Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The
Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the NewLangdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429,496
(1987) ("Certainty results not from any eternal verities untouched by human hands, but
rather from our culture, our customs, our politics, and our forms of life. This message
has at once reasuring and frightening implications, for it highlights our responsibility for
the certainties we choose.").
23. The phrase "cultural models" is rich with implications. Under this rubric we
find such related terms as "the social construction of reality," "simplified worlds,"
"prototypical events," "ideal cognitive models," to name but a few now found within the
precincts of sociolinguistics, cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology, and other
fields. See Quinn & Holland, supra note 22, at 35.
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practices and institutions may come to be seen as orderings of the world
that have been established jointly by participants who share the same
understanding and presumptions. As Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland
recently said, "[a] very large proportion of what we know and believe we
derive from... shared models that specify what is in the world and how
it works. "24
What these different terms seek to capture has been nicely described in Roger
Keesing's analysis of "folk models"-what he also calls "culturally constructed common
sense." According to Keesing, these models represent "a set of operating strategies for
using cultural knowledge in the world; they comprise shortcuts, idealizations, and
simplifying paradigms that work just well enough yet need not fit together without
contradiction into global systems of coherent knowledge." Roger M. Keesing, Models,
"Folk" and "Cultural" Paradigms Regained?, in CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 19, at
380.
In a similar vein, "metaphorical schemas" have been described as "factor[ing] out
contingent complexities of real life in proposing homologies of form, pattern, and
relationship between the source domain and the metaphorized one. A world thus
simplified becomes a world of the prototypical." Id. at 386; see also LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 22-24. Robert Abelson describes an analogous phenomenon
under the rubric of "scripts":
The casual definition of a script is a "stereotyped sequence of events familiar
to the individual." Implicit in the definition are two powerful sources of
constraint. One is the notion of an event sequence which implies the causal
chaining of enablements and results for physical events and of initiations and
reasons for mental events.. . . The other constraint generator comes from
ideas of stereotypy and familiarity. That an event sequence is stereotyped
implies the absence of fortuitous events. Also, for events to be often repeated
implies that there is some set of standard individual and institutional goals
which gives rise to the repetition.
Quinn & Holland, supra note 22, at 19-20 (quoting Robert P. Abelson, Constraint,
Construal, and Cognitive Science, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE
OF THE COGNrrnvE SCIENCE SOCIETY 1, 3 (1981).
The interpenetration of cultural models--the various ways in which a widely
applicable model may be used or "nested" within other more specialized models, thereby
lending cultures their convergent thematicity-is a phenomenon that has also been studied
with fascinating results. See generally Paul Kay, Linguistic Competence and Folk
Theories of Language: Two English Hedges, in CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 19, at
67, 69, 73 (using the concept of folk theory to analyze the meaning of "loosely
speaking" and "technically"); Naomi Quinn, Convergent Evidence for a Cultural Model
ofAmerican Marriage, in CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 19, at 35 (suggesting that our
understanding of marriage is derived from our folk physics of difficult activities, which
is itself a cultural model within a cultural model); Eve E. Sweetser, The Definition of
Lie: An Examination of the Folk Models Underlying a Semantic Prototype, in CULTURAL
MODELS, supra note 19, at 43 (examining the local social understanding of lying in
conjunction with popular beliefs about information).
24. Quinn & Holland, supra note 22, at 3; cf. RICHARD NISBET & LEE Ross,
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If we take this view seriously, and recent studies increasingly suggest
that we should,' it follows that an adequate understanding of our social
practices and institutions, including legal practices and institutions, cannot
be gained without adequate knowledge of the various underlying cultural
models that create and sustain them..Thus we are led to wonder: What are
the models that individual participants in the legal culture carry around
inside their heads? What must they know in order to act as they do and to
interpret their experience in the distinctive way that they do?' By what
narrative constructions is their shared sense of human and social reality
maintained or altered?'
A cultural view, which lawyering theory adopts, takes up precisely
these kinds of questions. It looks for those taken-for-granted models,
prototypes, schemas, or images of'self, others, and social institutions that
make up particular social domains and legal practices. It looks for the
simplified "scripts"' that participants use to explain how the world
works and how people can be expected to behave in different social
settings." Much of our communication relies upon tacit assumptions. It
HUMAN INFERENCE 293 (1980) ("Once one recognizes that the same data would look
quite different, and could easily support different beliefs, if those data were viewed from
the vantage point of alternative theories, the groundwork for a humbler epistemic stance
has been laid.").
25. See, e.g., Sweetser, supra note 23, at 16-18 (discussing how the semantic
structure of one English word depends on, and reflects, models of discrete areas of
experience). The articles in this symposium similarly support a "constructivist" viewpoint
grounded in highly contextualized analyses of knowledge and perception.
26. See Quinn & Holland, supra note 22, at 4.
27. See WERTSCH, supra note 11, at 138 ("'[A]s soon as speech and the use of signs
are incorporated into any action, the action becomes transformed and organized along
entirely new lines.'") (quoting Lev Semenovich Vygotsky).
28. See, e.g., ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS
AND UNDERSTANDING 42-46 (1977) (describing what has now become the classic
"restaurant script"). But cf. SWEETER, supra note 11, at 1415 (cautioning against false
universalization of features within a given language).
29. Consider, for example, how during the late nineteenth century personal injuries
involving strangers often prompted a negligence or "fault-based" judicial analysis, while
injuries involving defective products usually triggered a contract analysis and injuries
involving, say, entrants on land prompted an entirely different analysis shaped and
informed by talk about property rights and duties. See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical
Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981)
(discussing the "tenacity of established patterns of thought" in late nineteenth-century
judicial opinions involving liability for accidental harm); M.A.K. HALLIDAY, LANGUAOE
AS SOCIAL SEMIOTic 32 (1978) ("All language functions in context of situation .... The
question is not what peculiarities of vocabulary, or grammar of pronunciation, can be
directly accounted for by reference to the situation. It is which kinds of situational
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could not be otherwise. In the course of conversation we could never
comfortably spell out in detail-even if it occurred to us to try-the
various causal links and shared inferences that allow for the relatively
smooth exchange of meanings that takes place in everyday discourse. Yet,
studies show that the cultural knowledge that allows us, for the most part
intuitively, to utilize, one particular cultural model or linguistic "tool
kit"31 rather than another to facilitate communication in a particular
situation can be specified. This sort of linguistic or rhetorical analysis
leads to interesting and not so obvious findings. For example, some
studies are beginning to suggest that certain unified themes pervade our
factor[s] determine which kinds of selection in the linguistic system."); M. KRECKEL,
COMMUNICATIVE ACTs AND SHARED KNOWLEDGE IN NATURAL DISCOURSE 17-22 (1981)
(describing situational and contextual features of speech).
The existence and effects of subconsciously held or habituated, or ideologically
driven responses to discrete conflict situations offers a rich subject for future legal
sociolinguistic research. See, e.g., RobertW. Gordon, Legal Thought andLegal Practice
in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 109 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983):
The project of trying to link legal changes in particular fields of law to large-
scale ideological change derives much of its appeal from the fact that one
seems to be able to see similar changes in the background conventions of
discourse that take place concurrently across a variety of legal fields that are
occupied by entirely different lineups of interests.
Id.; see also George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV.
469, 469 (1976) (explaining how the common law of larceny can be understood in terms
of two structural principles: possessorial immunity and manifest criminality); Sherwin,
supra note 10, at 730 (arguing that a court's discourse should be assessed in light of the
particular dialect that it privileges and the way in which such official sanction is given,
and suggesting a method for reading legal arguments and judicial decisions within the
confines of a particular dialect).
30. See generally Dorothy Holland & Debra Skinner, Prestige and Intimacy, in
CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 19, at 79 (discussing conversation that has been steeped
in unspoken expectations and implicit common knowledge among members of the same
cultural group).
31. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 1i; Bruner, supra note 6, at 2. The analogy
linking language and tools can be traced to Vygotsky's extension of Engel's notion of
"psychological tools." See WERTSCH, supra note 11, at 77-80; see also Kay, supra note
23, at 68-69 (explaining that cultural models may be thought of as resources or tools);
Patterson, supra note 9, at 310 ("With the abandonment of the modernist aspiration
toward a master discourse. . . comes the realization that progressive change in a
discipline must be reconceived as coming not from without but from within. That is,
change must come from the redesign of our tools.") Patterson quite rightly notes in this
regard the relevant work of Kenneth Gergen, Correspondence Versus Autonomy in the
Language of Understanding Human Action, in METATHEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra
note 17, at 136.
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cultural knowledge. 32 If this turns out to be the case within our legal
culture as well, it may help to account for the ways in which shared
meanings create and maintain a dominant legal regime through
conventional discursive practices. 3 We may soon come to realize that we
understand one another, to the extent that we do, not because we see the
same things, but because we see in the same way, with the same
internalized cultural models.'
Beyond increasing our knowledge about the way we frame our
experience, the cultural view being proposed here can also expose to
detailed analysis the variety of linguistic tools that may be utilized with
more or less efficacy in a given situation. 5 As a result of such focused
32. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 34-35.
33. By "discursivepractice," I mean the mode of action, or what an actor does with
language in a particular communicative context. See, e.g., Bronislaw Malinowski, The
Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages, in THE MEANING OF MEANING 296, 307
(C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards eds., 1989) ("A statement spoken in real life is never
detached from the situation in which it has been uttered."). As Charles Taylor notes:
Even in an area where there are no clearly defined rules, there are distinctions
between different sorts of behaviour such that one sort is considered the
appropriate form for one action or context, the other for another action or
context; for example, doing or saying certain things amounts to breaking off
negotiations, doing or saying other things amounts to making a new offer.
Taylor, supra note 15, at 34; see also Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 7, at 60-63
(noting conventional sources of argumentation that shape and inform legal narratives in
criminal law practice); William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the
Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 137, 137 (1988) (describing persistent
patterns in civil litigants' values, expectations, and misapprehensions with regard to the
litigation process and its outcome); Sherwin, supra note 10, at 733 (describing discrete
forms of legal discourse in criminal procedure which persist, in varying degrees of
cultural ascendancy or decline, from one generation to the next).
34. Cardozo gets at this sort of thing in one of his pithy remarks: "Metaphors [begin
by] . . . liberat[ing] thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave.
Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). The same notion resonates in the commonplace
"life imitates art."
35. An intriguing parallel may yet be drawn between recent analyses of cultural
models in sociolinguistics, cognitive and cultural anthropology, psychology and
pragmatics, and the ancient Greek, classicalRoman, and medieval European rhetoricians'
efforts to compile arguments or "topics" for training in effective public discourse. May
these rhetorical collections of commonplaces be viewed as an archive of social knowledge
or operative cultural models or schemas that could be dipped into for purposes of
facilitating effective communication? See, e.g., Isocrates' Antidosis, the Tetralogies of
Antiphon, Gorgias' Encomium of Helen and Defense of Palamedes, Demosthenes' corpus
(including 60 speeches), Plato's Phaedrus, Aristotle's Topics, and Cicero's Topics and
On Oratory, to name a few well-known rhetorical compilations. See generally GEORGE
KENNEDY, THE ART OF PERSUASION IN GREEcE (1963) and its companion text THE ART
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analysis, specific choices of discourse can be made with greater
deliberation and care. That this enhanced knowledge of, and subsequent
sensitivity to, choice of language and its consequences stands to improve
communication and persuasiveness, and hell to avoid misunderstanding,
should not be lost upon a group as dependent upon discourse as is the
legal profession.'
By this accounting, then, it may not seem surprising to say along with
Holmes that the study of law puts us on the road to anthropology. For it
is anthropology, with the aid of linguistics, psychology, and other
disciplines, that opens the way to studying not only how people use
language to make persuasive arguments and to tell stories describing
individuals and events in particular settings, but also how to discern the
different patterns of meaning that their language embodies and, in varying
degrees, conveys to others.' Thus, the cultural turn that takes us beyond
modernist rationalism leads us from narratives made up of "objective"
truths and "universal" categories of "natural" reason to a path of
reflection about how meanings emerge in the first place. This path invites
us to explore a distinct set of issues, such as: (1) how various narratives
construct or obscure meaning in everyday legal practices; and (2) how
dominant legal discourses frame our experience and judgments, telling us
what is there (what the relevant facts are, or what a "fact" is in the first
oF RHToRIuc IN THE ROMAN WORLD (1972); RUTH MORSE, TRUTH AND CONVENTION
IN THE MIDDLE AOEs (1991); Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L.
REV. 1779 (1991).
36. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration
Exploring Hierarchy and 'Feminine' Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1680-81 (1991)
(demonstrating how a "feminine" style of attorney discourse, one that is "appropriately
uncertain" and "appropriately deferential" to client needs and interests, may invite a
broader search for meaning within a broader range of possibly applicable norms and facts
than the more controlling, interruptive, and loquacious "male" style of attorney
discourse). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Styles ofLawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039
(1992) (discussing male and female styles of lawyering).
37. See, e.g., Catherine Lutz, Goals, Events, and Understanding in faluk Emotion
Theory, in CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 19, at 291, 291:
The study of ethnotheory involves the identification of the knowledge
structures that underlie speech, and more generally, understanding. This
knowledge is largely below the level of explicit awareness and generally
remains unverbalized. One special circumstance that permits the recognition
of both one's own and others' tacit knowledge is the crossing of cultural
boundaries. The (at least partial) nonsharing of knowledge across those
boundaries encourages the identification and verbalization of taken-for-granted
realities.
Id.; see also Alan Hunt, Foucault's Expulsion ofLaw: Toward A Retrieval, 17 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1, 32 (1992).
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place), what norms apply, and what goals should be pursued by what
methods in a given context.
From just this brief listing, one may begin to see how valuable this
approach can be to legal practitioners and scholars alike. For example, if
it turns out that discrete cultural models motivate human behavior in
different ways, it becomes of interest to identify how people make sense
of different kinds of behavior within a particular social setting. Some
underlying cultural models may authorize or condemn certain kinds of
behavior only in certain contexts. For instance, what constitutes a lie in
one context may be persuasively redescribed as a socially acceptable
"white lie" in another. 8 Or consider criminal cases involving behavior
that may be construed as "murder" when described according to one
narrative style or genre but may be persuasively redescribed as"manslaughter" by switching to another narrative form.39 In short,
whether it be scholars seeking to make sense of evidentiary rules, or
practitioners whose job it is to make facts tell a certain kind of story,
adopting a lawyering-theory perspective is likely to produce new and
useful insights.'
Legal doctrine can also be mined for cultural models and operative
tool kits. Take, for example, the common law's past reliance upon the
discourse of ordinary common sense (i.e., legal folk models) to tell us
what a thief looks like41 or why under certain circumstances a criminal
defendant's "confession" after arrest cannot be trusted in court. 42
Compare this once common way of thinking and speaking with the more
contemporary, specialized discourse of legislative policy making-
according to which "theft" can mean such counter-intuitive things as
taking "non-public information," as in cases of insider stock trading. Or
consider the specialized discourse of constitutional interpretation-
according to which a post-arrest "confession" may be excluded from court
as a matter of principle regardless of the statement's factual reliability.'
38. See Sweetser, supra note 23, at 53-54 (discussing white lies and social lies).
39. See Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 7. See generally Martha Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988) (discussing the shift away from law-
oriented discoursein child custody cases toward the discourseof the helping professions).
40. See Kim L. Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentlary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 123 (1992); see also
WLLIAM TwN, RETHINKno EVIDENCE24 (1990) ("A direct approach to the analysis
of evidence [and related matters] may also help to illuminate the relations between
rational and nonrational factors and different conceptions of rationality.").
41. See Fletcher, supra note 29, at 473.
42. See Sherwin, supra note 10, at 750-51.
43. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (opposing convictions based
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These shifts in the way law narrates reality not only change the way
"justice" is done, but also the language that is allowed to do it.
Changes in mainstream culture frequently affect the law both in terms
of how it is understood and taught and how it is practiced." What is now
happening to the way we understand self, reason, and knowledge is likely
to have its own distinctive impact upon the legal'culture. This overview
and the articles that follow suggest a way of grasping significant and
overlapping patterns within the mainstream and the legal culture. This
work also encourages further efforts to begin building bridges both
intramurally (establishing ties among different legal scholars and between
legal scholars and practitioners) and extramurally (reaching out to experts
in other fields and to the public at large). If we succeed in this, perhaps
we will have managed to take a step toward reviving the law's historic
role as a widely respected intellectual, artistic, and political force within
American society. 4
In Part II of this article, I set out in further detail why I believe that
Holmes's insight regarding the anthropology of law is just right for where
we are now in the history of the legal culture. The effort here is to pull
together various strands from recent developments in the legal field and
in other relevant disciplines, including cultural anthropology, cognitive
psychology, linguistics, and philosophy. Part III provides an overview of
the new insights lawyering theory has to offer with regard to conventional
practices of lawyering and law teaching. Here, the effort is to see what the
often discussed process of judicial decision making and the much less
discussed topic of lawyering practices in everyday life look like when
viewed from a lawyering-theory perspective. This discussion will lead to
an expanded understanding of what law is and where it takes place-which
is to say, not simply in the realm of judicial decision making or of
statutory or regulatory enactment, but also between lawyers and clients,
lawyers and bureaucrats, complainants and court clerks, and elsewhere.'
on coerced confessions, not because they were untrue, but "because the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law:
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system").
44. See, e.g., infra part II.A. (discussing the impact of modernism on legal theory
and law teaching).
45. See ROBERT A. FERoUSON, LAW AND LE'rERs iN A1mPECAN CuLTURE 9-10
(1984).
46. As Robert Gordon has aptly stated, "every legal practice-from drafting a
complaint for simple debt to writing a constitution-makes a contribution to building a
general ideological scheme." Gordon, supra note 29, at 72. Gordon also notes that
[w]hen a lawyer helps a client arrange a transaction so as to take maximum
advantage of the current legal framework, he or she becomes one of the army
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Because this symposium is meant to provide a point of departure, Part
IV concludes with a research program describing the kinds of studies that
might be undertaken in the future by those who have been sufficiently
enticed to pursue further a lawyering-theory perspective.
II. CURRENT INTRAMURAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONVERGENCES
A. Some Background in the History of Ideas
Writing with an ear for the music and deceptive simplicity of everyday
language, Raymond Carver once framed a collection of short stories under
the title, What We Talk About When We Talk About Love. 7 There, as
elsewhere in his work, Carver calls attention to the artful and subtle ways
in which ordinary discourse carves meaning from experience. Carver
makes us see what we so often take for granted: without discourse there
would be no place for us to be in. No place, and no us." We are
creatures of language. We know ourselves, others, and social realities
through the language that is at our disposal: the language in which we
speak or write to others, and the language that goes on inside our heads.
The central insight is this: language is not epiphenomenal. It is not the
servant of reality or ideas. It is not something that, having done its job
freighting meanings about, simply drops away. What we know and
perhaps also what we feel about ourselves and reality are inextricably tied
to the language we use.
This insight about the phenomenality of language-that discursive
meanings in particular times and places do not "contain" objective or
universal "data" or "Ideas," but rather constitute human understanding-
marks one of the key points of departure for the postmodern
of agents who confirm that framework by reinforcement and extend it by
interpretation into many niches of social life. The framework is an ideological
one, i.e., a set of assertions, arguments, and implicit assumptions about power
and right.
Id. at 110; see also Bourdieu, supra note 12, at 827; Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All
Over".• Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Wetfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 343 (1990); Michael McConville & Chester Mirsky, Teaching Poor People
Compliance with Law: The Ideology of Rights in Criminal Court (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
The "oral tradition" in landlord-tenant law, which has increasingly supplanted
statutory and case law, may offer another interesting source for "everyday lawmaking."
I am indebted to Rick Marsico, an active practitioner in housing law, for this suggestion.
47. RAYMOND CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABouT LOVE
(1981).
48. See MARTIN HEIDEGER, PoETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 165-86 (Albert
Hofstadter ed. & trans., 1971).
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movement. 9 Convergent patterns in the works of many contemporary
cultural anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, psychoanalysts,
linguists, and philosophers flow around this realization: Psyche and
culture, folk knowledge and individual imagination; self-identity and social
convention, are mutually constitutive. As this perspective increasingly
influences mainstream culture, it is likely to become more conspicuous
within the legal culture as well. Is this a big deal? A little history suggests
that it's plenty big.
With the modem Enlightenment, science came into its own. The genre
and canons of logic, strict causality and prediction provided the most
persuasive (i.e., authoritative) terms for talking about and assessing the
world of nature and humanity. Newton metaphorically set the universe
running like a big clockwork, and ever since scientists and philosophers
have been calculating the causal mechanics of observable human behavior
and natural events. Absent rigorous quantitative methods, they said,
nothing could be reliably known. And so it went: the natural and human
world was constituted on the basis of what could be "proven," which is
to say, measured-empirically, statistically, or duplicably by others. What
escaped the calculus was meaningless. Across the board-in philosophy,
sociology, anthropology, and psychology-if it didn't measure up, it
wasn't knowable, and if it wasn't knowable, it didn't warrant being
considered a part of our world.
Now the adherents of the Enlightenment were an enthusiastic bunch,
but they had their detractors. This was so from the beginning. For
example, folks like Bishop Berkeley began seriously to worry when the
Liberal philosopher John Locke tried to take Newton's causal system a
step further. Locke insisted that we can only know the world by the way
it causes innate ideas to light up in our heads. Heresy! cried Berkeley.
49. To be sure, these are not entirely new ideas. The ancient Greeks seem to have
been gripped by similar notions. See Charles P. Segal, Gorgias and the Psychology of
the Logos, 66 HARv. STUD. CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 99, 109-10 (1962). Around the
middle of the fifth-century B.C., Gorgias wrote: "'For that by which we impart
information is logos, but logos is not the things that are or that exist; we do not then
impart to others the things that exist, but only logos, which is other than the things that
exist .... [S]peech... is its own master.'" Id. (quoting Gorgias of Leontini). Segal
comments: "'Reality' for [Gorgias] lies in the human psyche and its malleability and
susceptibility to the effects of linguistic corruscation." Id. at 110. It is notable that even
as Descartes' rationalist influence was reaching its height in Europe, the rhetorical
reality-making perspective was not entirely lost from view. See THE NEW SCIENCE OF
GIAMBATTISTA VICO 1-6 (Thomas G. Bergin & Max H. Fisch trans., Anchor Books
1961) (1744); 1 ANTHONY EARL OF SHAFESBURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN,
MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES, rc. 189 (John M. Robertson ed., 1963). According to
Shaftesbury, "[t]he most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a system." Id.; see
also CASSlnER, supra note 14, at 332.
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What room does this mechanical, strictly causal system leave for God? So
Berkeley countered: Locke's got this mechanical causation business all
wrong. The only reason we can know anything at all of the world (or of
other beings, or of ourselves for that matter) is because God wills ideas
about these things to light up in our heads. According to Berkeley, without
God's will to guarantee causation all we could do is project hypotheses.
And that, Berkeley implies, would be like living in a dreamworld. This
is a notion to which we will return.
There were other detractors of Newton and his scientifically
enlightened crowd as well. Those who felt left out of the scientists'
mechanical systems: the poets and free spirits in particular, such as Blake,
Wordsworth, Goethe, and the later German Romantics, Schiller, Heine,
and Holderlin. What of the Spirit? they and others like them cried. What
of the human genius for living life through feeling, heroics, novelty, or
sacrifice? Where is there room for these things within the scientists'
quantified world of data?
So the modem Enlightenment gave rise to its Romantic Doppelganger.
In the memorable words of Dostoeviky's underground man, better insanity
than to become an integer in someone else's system. 5 In short, the
mechanistic reductivism of science gave rise to a surge of the irrational.
The ensuing tension-between universal, unchanging Reason and nature's
calculable order on the one hand, and the incalculable, disordered flux of
Spirit (in the world and through the soul) on the other hand-is one that
typifies the modernist age.' Notwithstanding their radical differences,
however, the scientists and the romantics shared one thing in common:
they both believed that what they were thinking and talking about were the
things themselves. Whether it was the dictates of universal reason or of
universal spirit, it was irreducibly real. In short, they believed they were
50. See GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING PRINCiPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE 21-22, 110-11 (G.J. Warnock ed., Open Court Publishing Co. 1986) (A
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Hwnan Knowledge was first published in 1710;
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous was first published in 1713).
51. See Notes from the Underground, in GREAT SHORT WORKs OF FYDOR
DOSTOEVSKY 279 (Ronald Hingley ed. & David Magarshack trans., 1968); see also
HENRY D. THoREAu, WALDEN AND CrVIL DISOBEDiENCE 396 (Penguin Books 1986)
(1849) (urging that if the machinery of government requires one to be an agent of
injustice, then one should let his or her life be "a counter friction to stop the machine");
2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SociETY 476 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Bedminster Press Inc. 1968) (discussing the increasing secularization, bureaucratization,
and impersonality of everyday life).
52. Not the modernist age alone, of course. See, e.g., NANCY S. STRuEVER, THE
LANGUAGE OF HISTORY IN THE RENAISSANCE 12 (1970) (discussing Gorgias's rejection




describing if not "the way things are," at least the way the natural
categories of reason ordered them to be.' This commonplace would change.
But before taking up that break with the modernist tension which we
call postmodernism, a word is due on how the culture of modernism has
given form and content to our understanding of law.
B. Some Developments in the History of the Legal Culture
During the nineteenth century, law was touted by many as a
handmaiden to the methods and categories of science. This was, at the
time, the royal road to respectability. As a science, law gained authority.
The move in this direction was most apparent from the pervasive
systematizing of teacher/scholars like Langdell. In their view, common
law, like nature itself, could be read as a system of order; it was made up
of logically consistent abstract principles. Textbooks were to be written,
cases were to be studied, and law classes were to be taught along strictly
inductive and deductivist lines. 5'
Of course, in time, as a practical matter, the effort to systemize law
fully could not succeed.55 Yet, faith in the ordering power of reason did
not fail. It simply sought new sources.
53. See SHWEDER, supra note 11, at 356-58; Richard A. Shweder, Anthropology's
Romantic Rebellion Against the Enlightenment, Or There 's More to Thinking than Reason
and Evidence, in CULTURE THEORY, supra note 8, at 27, 45.
54. See, e.g., William P. LaPiana, "A Task of No Common Magnitude"." The
Founding of the American Law Institute, 11 NOVA L. REv. 1085, 1096 (1987)
(describing Christopher Columbus Langdell's taxonomic definition of legal science);
William P. LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An
Investigation of the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 771,
774-77 (1986) (quoting Justice Story's definition of the law as "'a system of elementary
principles and of general juridical truths,'" and explaining that practitioners in antebellum
America regarded law as a deductive process of applying principles to specific cases).
55. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 907, 908 (1933):
The so-called case-system... was the expression of the strange character of
a cloistered, retiring bookish man. Due to Langdell's idiosyncracies, law
school came to mean library-law. "
It was inevitable that those who have administered those numerous
university law schools which are shaped according to the Langdell pattern
should, for the most part, seek as law teachers those who have had little or no
contacts with or a positive distaste for the rough-and-tumble activities of the
average lawyer's life.
Id.; see also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 389 (connecting critique of Langdellian
formalism to a shift in ideology). See generally Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose
of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) (shifting the analysis and
critique of law from mechanical jurisprudence to a jurisprudence based on social
conditions and social progress).
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The Legal Realists turned on Langdell and his scientistic
sympathizers. The Realists convincingly argued that belief in the inherent
order of the common law, and the classificatory system that "rational"
doctrine allegedly gave rise to, could not be maintained. The role of
hunches in the judicial decision-making process and the seemingly endless
manipulability of precedents in the service of subjective preferences
seriously undercut the.previous generation's faith in the law's ultimate
rationality. So rather than operate deductively, applying general abstract
principles derived either from nature, history, or from extant case law,'
Legal Realist reason turned thoroughly inductive. Cast out amid pressing
social realities, the Realists sought a home in policy science. If legal
conflicts were to be properly settled, decision makers would now have to
obtain normative guidance from the particulars of the situation before the
court. Once the specific needs or social interests embodied within a
particular conflict situation were discerned (and Jerome Frank, for one,
apparently believed that accurate fact-finding would provide jurists with
a reliable basis for such discernment), 7 those interests could be properly
balanced in accordance with an appropriate social calculus. Interest
balancing, it was thought, could then build up, if not a systematic, then at
least a coherent body of law that would do justice to the realities of the
present-rather than the abstract rationalist phantoms of the past.
In this way, the Realists kept the case method alive, but turned it on
its head. The cases were now taught largely to subvert the Langdellian
universe. Instead of showing coherent principles simply waiting to be
discovered, the Realist law teachers showed conflict. Instead of showing
a squarely deductive-reasoning process at work in the caselaw, they
showed subjectivity. And the muddle that this dumped in everyone's lap?
The new faith the Realists held out was that policy science would set
things straight. All that was needed was the right comprehensive view
regarding the good that social policy demands. With that in hand, duly
implemented through statutory or regulatory enactments, the proper
56. See William P. LaPiana, Jurisprudence of History and Truth, 23 RuToERs L.J.
519, 534-45, 558 (1992) (describing the use of history by notable nineteenth-century
American jurists as an adjunct to the study of "scientific jurisprudence"-which is to say,
the study of the "true principles of law"). Whether universal principles of justice were
thought to be discoverable in reason itself, as attorney and legal scholar George H. Smith
believed, in history's natural progression, a notion attributed at the time to Sir Henry
Maine, or in common-law cases, a nontheistie notion popularized by Langdell, the pre-
Legal Realist emphasis on law's susceptibility to scientific systemization remained strong.
See id.
57. Frhnk's critique of the modem trial implies that the application of various
reforms would facilitate the search for truth. In this view, it is not that external truths
are unattainable, it is simply that our present court procedures stand in the way of their
acquisition. See JERomE FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 102 (1949).
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balance could be made from case to case. 8 Of course, whether the
operative policy should measure things exclusively in consequentialist
terms (and if so, what specific sense of the social good to be maximized
should be chosen), or whether policy should instead be a matter of
enhancing a particular sense of the right (whether it be a principle of fair
process or of individual integrity) was never resolved by the Realists. It
was a problem others would inherit.' Suffice it to say, the shift in the
legal culture wrought by the Legal Realists may still be viewed as an event
that occurred within the modernist framework. For in the Realists' view,
reason orders things fairly well-provided that it works inductively from
the facts to organizing policy systems rather than deductively from unduly
abstract conceptualizations.
In the next generation, new critical voices would arise to take on the
Realists' persistent faith in the power of reason and in the organizational
efficacy of policy science. One group of critics complained that the
methods of science are no more or less resourceful-or, for that matter,
"objective"-with regard to choice of norms when they operate inductively
than when they operate deductively. ' The Realists may have succeeded
in displacing the controversy about reason from a level of abstract
generality to one of concrete particularity, these critics maintained. But in
the end the Realists, too, were caught up short: for the certainty of a
rational order lies no more in facts than it does in doctrine.6"
It was at this juncture in the legal culture that the post-Realist radicals
entered the scene. According to some in the recent critical legal studies
(CLS) movement, for example, the Realist critique failed to go far
enough. In this view, the Realists got the critique of conceptualism right,
58. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. MeDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203,203 (1943); Karl
N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: , 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341,408-09
(1937) (arguing that "conscious regulative policy" would be required to give shape to an
incoherent case law).
59. See Note, Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical
Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1686 (1982).
60. See Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1229, 1233 (1981); Peter Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions:
Outline of a Method for CriticalLegal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601,601 (1977); Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591 (1981); Mark Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'y PuB. TcHRs. L.
20, 21-23 (1980). See generally Shweder, supra note 53, at 44-45 (pointing to insights
regarding the contingency of culture as the most significant development to emerge
within cognitive anthropology in recent years).
61. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendence
and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 444-54 (1987) (describing
the demise of the Realists' "new objectivism" with regard to "the facts").
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but they were naive in another respect. They failed to realize that there are
no immanent social goals waiting to be judicially induced from particular
fact scenarios.' What the Realists did not adequately appreciate, these
new critics said, is the thoroughly political nature of the social policies
that are operating in the case law. And the politics, these critics argued,
are plain wrong.'
Of course, one could take up the new critics' charge and turn it
around. For example, one could say that by replacing one set of policy
objectives with another-by urging greater maximization of equality, say,
rather than individual autonomy-the new critics did not really break
with the Realists' model of reason.' They simply posited a different
comprehensive view through which particular facts could be inductively
sifted to get the "right result" in each case. In this respect, these new
critics' version of post-Realist critique, like the Realist movement before
them, may also be viewed as a "modernist" phenomenon.'
62. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1017, 1028-29 (1981) (discussing the legal formalists' inclination to seek immanent
rationality in social life).
63. See Al Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays on Adjudication and
Politics, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 383, 434 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory
as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275, 1276 (1981).
64. Consider, for example, Duncan Kennedy's use of binary oppositions, such as
the one between the individual and the community. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 211-12 (1979).
65. There seems to be an unarticulated assumption shared by some CLS scholars
that uncovering contradictions within liberal theory or legal doctrine suffices as a catalyst
for progressive political change. This implicit conviction reflects a continuing
commitment to modernist rationality. For one thing, it continues the modernist dichotomy
between rationality and disorder (i.e., if the law is not rationally coherent it must be
irrational and indeterminate). The CLS message that emerges here is that the only
(logical?) alternative to irrational contradiction, aside from chaos, must be an alternative
(presumably a more politically "progressive") form of legal rationalization. But, of
course, as J.M. Balkin lucidly points out, keying into the rhetoric that characterizes a
form of legal discourse does not in and of itself encourage any particular political
agenda. Nor is any particular form of political discourse free from "rhetorization." See
J.M. Balkin, The Promise ofLegal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1843-44 (1991);
Williams, supra note 61, at 477-91.
66. In other words, the modernist quest for certainty and the concomitant inclination
to reduce things to absolutes-"the law is either structurally coherent or indeterminate"
-remains operative in much CLS literature.
Other contemporary legal scholars have actively sought to adopt a "postmodern"
stance that moves beyond these familiar modernist dichotomies. Consider, for example,
the cultural and cognitive orientation of Pierre Schlag and Steven Winter. See Pierre
Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1627 (1991); Steven L. Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1441,
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To be sure, many in the post-Realist generation were left unpersuaded
by the critics' call for a new politics of law. Among them were those whomaintained that there are sufficiently objective, "self-evident" first
principles to generate a workable comprehensive view of law. For
believers in the market system, in individual autonomy and free choice,
and in the existence of a calculus by which to measure one's choices, the
rational systemization of law once again becomes a viable goal. Whether
such a clear-cut calculus exists, whether human pleasure and pain are to,
be measured in wealth-maximization terms or in accordance with some
other sense of social welfare, whether such a calculus, conceding it does
exist, could operate neutrally, apart from the tug of politics and ideology,
and whether interest-maxinization can do justice to a constitutional regime
that includes certain "incalculable" individual rights over and beyond
contract and property rights, remain hotly contested matters.
It is at this juncture that lawyering theory may provide some
assistance. Whether the effort is to develop a more consistent or
contextually astute approach to measuring social utility, or to explore more
fully our understanding of human reason (e.g., to assess how rational or
self-interested one may expect everyday decision making to be, or what"rationality" means in everyday practices),' or to replace comprehensive
social objectives such as utility-maximization with some other schema or
schemata (e.g., one that reflects society's multicultural and multivocal
reality), or, on a more mundane level, to improve the services lawyers
render to their clients, a better knowledge base is likely to help. And it is
in this capacity, as a contributor to knowledge, that lawyering theory now
seeks to make its mark in the current legal culture.
C. On Legal Constructivism: The Emergence of a
Lawyering-Theory Perspective
From what has been said so far, the postmodern moment may be
construed as a moment of great opportunity. For example, we now have
the chance to take leave of some of modernism's outworn and
unproductive dichotomies, like the antagonism that still exists between
theory and practice, facts and norms, rational knowledge and emotional
knowledge, truth and metaphor, to name a few.' A major objective of
1442 (1990).
67. See generally D'Andrade, supra note 19, at 112 (explaining that "through
hierarchical organization, human beings can comprehend a schema containing a very
large and complex number of discriminations" but that the "amount of work involved in
unpacking a complex cultural schema can be quite surprising").
68. By suggesting the opportunities postmodemism may present, I do not mean to
say that the postmodern era does not give rise to its own set of challenges. In this regard,
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lawyering theory is to work within the current postmodern framework in
an effort to provide novel approaches to inherited and contemporary
conflicts while also building upon extant practices within the legal culture.
New insights from other fields can provide much assistance in this
effort. And with the pivotal question, "How are meanings generated in
everyday life?" in hand, we are now in a better position to appreciate
what drives a great deal of the work that is currently under way in such
fields as cultural and cognitive psychology, natural-language philosophy
and pragnmatics, as well as in linguistics, sociology, history, and, to a
lesser (but hopefully increasing) degree, legal studies.' Studying
one may point to the impact of international commerce and global telecommunications
(wedded by their joint fabrication of a glistening electronic stream of fashion-making
imagery) as a cultural force. As a result of that force, life in our time not only imitates
art, it imitates the commercials as well. No doubt today's sophisticated tele-viewers
(those natural postmoderns who have come of age in an age when the absence of
television is no longer thinkable) feel at home with the fast-cut, slo-mo reframing of
reality-like the one used, apparently to such great effect, by defense attorneys in their
refashioning of the "video-reality" of the Los Angeles police beating of Rodney King.
Cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder has shrewdly and wittily described the
postmodern mentality as being dominated by the "placebo" effect. Belief being no longer
necessary, one says things like, "I've got a headache; I think I'll take a placebo for it.
.* . [And] it works." This suggests that in our postmodern existence, we had better hold
onto our prejudgments-or at least keep our options for prejudice open-for it may turn
out that that is all we've got to see and judge the world with. See Richard Shweder, The
Authority of Voice, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 251, 252 (1992).
If Shweder has his finger on something here, one might reasonably expect that the
curiois blend of complacency and disbelief that he describes must surely raise questions
about the continued efficacy or stability of moral and ethical judgments, not to mention
judgments of fact. For my own part, I think Ruth Morse points us in the right direction
(although surely she does not end the controversy) when she says:
The only defense against the manipulation of the listener's emotions [is] an
alert ear trained to discriminate not only good from bad arguments, but
successful from unsuccessful ploys. The best arguments used in a bad case
might be persuasive, but they ought not to succeed with someone educated
.... [We may pity the speaker, or be seduced by her, but we are meant to
think and to resist.
RUTH MORSE, TRuH AND CONVENTION IN THE MIDDLE ACEs 56-57 (1991).
In short, to understand what an event or a text or statement "means" calls for
rhetorical sophistication. We need to be as alert to form and context as to substance. See
J.M. Balkin, Essay: What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966,
1971-72 (1992) (describing at least one aspect of postmodernism not as a model to be
followed, but as a cultural event that needs to be studied and understood to see how
culture has changed "for better or worse").
69. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, Law and Social Theory: Preface, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1988); Elizabeth Mertz, Creative Acts of Translation: James Boyd White's
Intellectual Integration, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 165, 166 (1992) (book review); Albert
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J. Moore, Trial By Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273,
277, 278 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEx.
L. REV. 1195, 1208 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1106-07
(1989); Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Diferences: The Rules and Relationships ofLitigants'
Discourses, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1705 (1992) (reviewing CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note
7) (Conley and O'Barr analyze the relationship between different storytelling styles of
litigants and how their language affects results in the legal system); Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards An
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1339-57 (1992).
A good deal of the legal-cultural studies that have been appearing have been
showing up in the journal Law & Society Review. See, e.g., William L.F. Felstiner et
al., The Emergence Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming...,
15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 631, 632 (1980-1981); Christine B. Harrington & Sally E.
Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAw & Soc'y
REv. 709,711 (1988) (analyzing the formation of community mediation reform through
an ethnography of the culture and practices of local mediation programs); Lynn Mather
& Barbara Yngvesson,Language, Audience andthe Transformation ofDisputes, 15 LAw
& Soc'y REv. 775, 818 (1980-1981) (attempting to develop an analytical framework for
relating the management and outcome of individual disputes to the maintenance and
ongoing development of broaderpatterns of social order); Austin Sarat and William L.F.
Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & SOc'Y REv. 93,
94 (1986) (noting that the interaction between lawyer and client provides "one important
setting where law and society meet and where legal norms and folk norms come together
to shape responses to grievances, injuries and problems"); Barbara Yngvesson, Making
Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, The Court, and the Construction of Community in a
New England Town, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 409, 411 (1988) (focusing on the way
exchanges between clerks and citizens produce legal and moral frameworks that produce
decisions to handle a case in a particular way).
The dangers of "covert advocacy" or hidden forms of persuasion based on lawyers'
increased use of psychological (and one might add, linguistic, rhetorical, or other
cognitive-based) techniques of persuasion may also be worth noting here. See, e.g.,
Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion
Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 498 (1987) ("Covert advocacy
erodes jury cognitive independencebecause ajuror cannot scrutinize and choose to reject
a message from the advocate that is received on a subconscious level. Once the message
is received, it can then subconsciously affect other choices made by the jury about
subsequently received evidence."). Of course, the complaint against lawyer persuasion
is hardly new: the Sophists and rhetoricians of ancient Greece were perhaps the first-at
least as seen through Plato's lens-to give lawyers a bad name. Nevertheless, ethical
vigilance against inappropriate manipulation of knowledge and belief surely requires
ongoing professional monitoring. At the very least, what constitutes "inappropriate
manipulation" in practice must be clearly articulated. See Richard J. Burke, Politics as
Rhetoric, 93 ETIucS 45, 45 (1982):
Mhe attempt to persuade someone [rather than compelling him] risks failure
to persuade and thus recognizes his freedom as a human being to make up his
own mind. The difficulty of drawing the line in borderline cases-manipulative
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everyday life for patterns of meaning making allows us to see familiar
activities in a new light. Indeed, this approach has the power to convey a
sense of seeing things for the first time; and, in a certain respect, that may
be quite literally the case. So many of our discursive practices are
constructed by unconsciously internalized models, scripts, or cultural
schemas, that it seems quite natural for their ordering properties to operate
invisibly. For example, what makes something "common-sensical" is
precisely its obviousness. Common sense tells us "the way it is." The fact
that underlying structures-norms, metaphors, narratives of different
sorts-make up "the way it is" goes unrecognized. Common sense, like
most forms of local or folk knowledge, appears transparent: it is
experienced as an open window, rather than the refractive lens that it is.
One of the objectives of adopting a cultural perspective is precisely to
make the complex operation of folk and other underlying cultural models
come into view.
What has shown up in other fields as a result of this new attentiveness
to meaning making in everyday life? A great many things. For example,
a different view of the self-as something distributed, through stories
shared with others in local settings, as opposed to the classical liberal (and
existential) picture of an acontextual, autonomous "I."' Scholars are also
coming up with a different view of emotions: as something of real
cognitive interest, rather than a kind of "static" that interferes with useful
psychological understanding. 7' For its part, common sense itself has
advertising, religious cults, etc.-should not lead us to draw the fallacious
inference- that all persuasion or even irrational persuasion, is a form of
coercion.
Id.; see Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 721-32 (1987)
(discussing what constitutes coercion of a client). I believe that Aristotle's response to
complaints about inappropriate persuasion remains apt:
And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might
do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all
good things exceptvirtue, and above all against the things that are most useful,
as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest benefits
by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest injuries by using them wrongly
.... What makes a man a "sophist" is not his faculty, but his moral purpose.
ARISTOTLE, THE RHEORIC 23-24 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modem Library 1954).
70. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 107; Richard A. Shweder & Edmund J. Bourne,
Does the Concept of the Person Vary Cross-Culturally?, in CULTURE THEORY, supra
note 8, at 158.
71. See, e.g., George Lakoff & Zoltan Kovecses, The Cognitive Model of Anger
Inherent in American English, in CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 19, at 195, 195:
The Logic of Emotions would seem ... to be a contradiction in terms, since
emotions, being devoid of conceptual content, would give rise to no inferences
at all, or at least none of any interest. We would like to argue that the opposite
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come to be seen as a culture-specific phenomenon of great complexity and
variability from context to context.' In addition, various frames of
meaning have been "thickly"' described in a variety of cultural settings
radically different from our own, revealing local concepts of time or self
that, for all their differences with our own understanding of these matters,
nevertheless operate on the basis of an explicable logic.74 Patterns of
meaning making in everyday language have been studied in rhetorical
terms,7 as a matter of cooperative rules and the meanings that flow from
their violation,76 and in the context of participatory research in the
workplace.' Historians have shown the influence that narrative styles
have on the way reality can be known or recounted.7' The way racial or
ethnic prejudices show up in everyday conversation, unbeknownst to the
speaker (if not to the victim), has been thickly studied-revealing recurrent
dialogical and narratival, among other structural and cognitive,
components.' And a variety of covert frames of meaning ("folk models"
of knowledge) have been uncovered in a broad range of everyday
activities, such as dating practices among college-age women,' local
is true, that emotions have an extremely complex conceptual structure, which
gives rise to [a] wide variety of nontrivial inferences.
Id.; see Robert I. Levy, Emotion, Knowing, and Culture, in CULTURAL THEORY, supra
note 8, at 214, 218.
72. See GEERTZ, supra note 18, at 73-93.
73. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of
Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 3, at 3-30.
74. See Lutz, supra note 37, at 291; Shweder, supra note 53, at 40:
[C]ognitive scientists have advanced our understanding of the type of ideas
underlying nonrational action, and it has become more apparent that language,
thought, and society are built up out of ideas that fall beyond the sweep of
logical and scientific evaluation, ideas for which there are no universally
binding normative criteria.
Id.
75. See BURKE, supra note 7, at 51; KENNErH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIvES
42 (1962).
76. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WoRDs 118 (1989).
77. See Max Elden, Sharing the Research Work: Participative Research and Its Role
Demands, in HUMAN INQUIRY 253,253-65 (Peter Reason & John Rowans eds., 1981);,
William F. Whyte et al., Participatory Action Research, 32 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCINST
513, 537-38 (1989) (redefining labor/management roles and the local theory of work
organizations).
78. See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 43-45, 107-09.
79. See TEUN A. VAN DUK, PREJUDICE IN DISCOURSE 1-4 (1984).
80. See generally Holland & Skinner, supra note 30, at 78-108 (discussing data from
a group of college-age people using gender-marked conversation).
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efforts to describe lying,"' marriage," and even how home heat-control
systems work.3
What has begun to emerge from these studies, aside from new
knowledge about how meanings are made and remade in different times
and places, is the degree to which discrete cultural practices may consist
of basic building blocks-what some refer to as recurrent scripts and
simplified worlds." What is being suggested here is that there may be
more standardized ways of organizing experience-familar stories, say,
which make various practices in everyday life consistent and
expectable-than a simple survey of external behavior might otherwise
suggest." In short, to some explorable extent, worlds of meaning are
being built upon, and sustained by, recurrent and interlocking
frameworks-the stories," metaphors,"7  rituals,88  prototypical
scenarios,' and scripts' that are embodied in local practices. Studying
culture as the repository of such frameworks-including prototypical
events, prototypical roles for actors, and more9-is what anthropologists
in particular, and postmodern "constructivist" scholars in general, are
setting out to do.
81. See Sweetser, supra note 23, at 44.
82. See generally Quinn, supra note 23, at 174-88 (describing metaphors of
marriage that enable the speaker to express feelings about the marital experience).
83. See Willett Kempton, Two Theories of Home Heat Control, in CULTURAL
MODELS, supra note 19, at 222, 222-43.
84. Quinn & Holland, supra note 22, at 19; see also Shweder, supra note 53, at 35
("Memory drifts in the direction of preexisting semantic intuitions, and these intuitions
are far more structured'and coherent than actual experience.").
85. See generally BRENT BERLIN & PAUL KAY, BASIC COLOR TERMS (1969)
(describing a classic study on color perception).
86. See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2074-75 (1989).
87. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 85; GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,
FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987).
88. See VICTOR W. TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORs 23 (1974);
VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RIrUAL PROCESS 4 (1969).
89. See Winter, supra note 69, at 1148 (drawing upon Lakoff and Johnson's "ideal
cognitive models" [ICMs] in an analysis of legal argumentation). But Cf. Dennis
Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, 78 VA. L. REV. 937, 968
(1990) (critiquing as "science fiction" Winter's reliance upon "the mysteries of
unconscious structures"); Quinn & Holland, supra note 22, at 27 (noting studies
questioning Lakoff and Johnson's suggestion that our bodily interaction with the physical
environment provides an objective or universal source for metaphor production).
90. See SCHANK & ABELSON, supra note 28, at 36-68.
91. See Kempton, supra note 83, at 223.
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What, then, is the postmodem framework being described here?
Recall Bishop Berkeley's response to Locke: Without God in the works to
guarantee causality, humans alone would be responsible for the meanings
they project as reality. To think of the natural world in these terms struck
Berkeley as obviously untenable. Humans making up meanings for events
in nature? Absurd. But putting aside matters of teleology or metaphysics,
in the human sciences, as in the realm of arts and letters, it is precisely
the human authorship of meaning-the way we construct self and social
realities in our everyday discursive practices-that preoccupies the
postmodern thinker and observer. It is this fascination with the
construction of meaning in everyday life that brings us back to the reality-
maintaining (or transforming) power of narrative. What stories do we tell
ourselves and one another to act as we do, to know what we know, to say
the things we say in our dealings with others in society? What cultural
models are currently at work framing and explaining our experience of
ourselves, others, and the world around us? How do these models guide
our actions and motivate the behavior of others? How does communication
get formalized in discrete legal practices? And what sorts of
communication proceed most effectively in particular situations?
In short, in a postmodem legal framework in which discourse and
narrative take center stage, it seems most fitting to ponder (echoing
Carver) what we talk about when we talk about law. How do people who
are either engaged in or influenced by the law's diverse practices
understand what's going on?' How do they think and talk about their
situation and their role in it, and how might others interpret what they are
saying?9 What frames of reference, what cultural models or genres of
discourse, and what recurrent metphors do they use?' Upon what
canons of authority do they rely? ' What are their beliefs, hopes,
desires?' It is by following this line of inquiry that lawyering theory
aspires to broaden the scope of scholarly and practical analysis. Consistent
with this approach, it is of no less interest to explore how lay actors
understand what is going on around them, and how they communicate
their knowledge, beliefs, interests, goals, and so on, than how
professionals do so. In addition, from this viewpoint, actors in the legal
92. See GEERTZ, supra note 18, at 92.
93. See generally WILLIAM LABOV & DAVID FANSHEL, THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE
(1977) (exploring the goals and techniques of therapeutic discourse through a close
examination of the linguistic forms used by a patient and a therapist in the first 15
minutes of one session).
94. See BERLIN & KAY, supra note 85.
95. See Bourdieu, supra note 12; TZvETAN ToDORov, GENRES IN DISCOURSE
(Catherine Porter trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1978).
96. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 43.
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culture may also come to be seen not simply as seeking to settle or avoid
disputes, but also as helping to make up who they and others are in the
role of lawyer, client, judge, clerk, bureaucrat, juror, witness, and so on.
Indeed, we may now recognize that it is by virtue of these diverse and
overlapping understandings and multiple discursive practices that the legal
culture is being created and maintained (or altered). Put differently, amid
a myriad of individual actions, in a broad variety of social settings, lie the
symbolic forms, the inherited conceptualizations, the attitudes, feelings
and beliefs, by which we-lawyers and law teachers, judges and
legislators, administrators and lay persons-communicate, perpetuate, and
develop our understanding of the law and its practices.
By taking seriously the way participants in an activity understand and
experience what they are doing or what they perceive to be going on
around them, operative patterns of meaning-and the ways in which they
are constructed in everyday practices-may be brought to light. In this
way, the normative or strategic choices that a particular discourse allows
or inhibits can be made conscious and, as a result, subject to choice rather
than habit.' Awareness of the ways in which people tend to think and
speak about what is going on in certain kinds of situations also permits
more accurate analyses of the efficacy of communication in those
situations: Are the concerned parties speaking in different languages? Is
the meaning of a particular utterance different to different individuals
under different circumstances? Or, conversely, are there standard patterns
of discourse in certain types of conflict or conflict-avoidance situations?98
In sum, lawyering theory sets out to explore whether there are cultural
models that we should know about in our own neck of the woods, models
97. See Williams, supra note 22, at 496.
98. For an example of how one might uncover, in order to focus on and perhaps
change, the way people think about a particular conflict-ridden situation, consider Peter
Lazes, Innovative Approaches to Saving and Creating Jobs, NAT'L PRODUCTIVITY REV.
146, 146-54 (1985) (discussing resolution of labor/management disputes to the
satisfaction of both sides by "changing the shape of the box"-which is to say, by
persuading the participants to redefine habituated patterns of thinking and talking about
the role of labor and management in the workplace); see also Whyte et al., supra note
77, at 549:
We believe that progress in understanding the correlates of worker
participation depends upon a radical paradigm shift: changing the definitions
of variables and the specification of what is to be measured. If a paradigm shift
is necessary to advance theory, it appears to us that [participation action
research] is more likely to cause such a shift than standard research methods.
Id.; Max Elden, Varieties of Workplace Participatory Research 6 (July 15, 1981)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("Progress is measured by how well the




that have been internalized and that are being played out in diverse legal
practices. Can we too find recurring patterns, or scripts, or simplified
worlds embodied in the stories that we hear and tell ourselves and others
about the way the law works? The raison d'9tre of this symposium
consists not only in raising such questions, but also in persuasively
showing the constructive role that a lawyering-theory perspective can play
in answering them.
In what follows, I would like to push further along this path by
reconsidering what law teachers and scholars talk about when they talk
about law.
III. LAWYERING, LAW TEACHING, AND LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED
A. Genres and Canons in the Discursive Activities of Law
Traditionally, the question of how jurists think and talk about the law
and its practices, to the extent that it is raised at all, has been kept on a
rather tight rein. For example, while clinical legal education has grown
over the years, its intellectual status remains a source of great
controversy.' Should it be a respectable thing for a law teacher to spend
time thinking and talking about what lawyers do before their client's
problem becomes a matter for the courts? Is consideration of how lawyers
initially get a client's story, how they perceive the client's goals and
generate possible means for achieving them, how they obtain and arrange
facts to facilitate a particular legal theory of the case, or how they settle
99. See, e.g., LawrenceM. Grosberg, Introduction: Defining Clinical Scholarship,
35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1990) ("Should clinicians produce scholarship?... If it
is found that they should, what kind of scholarship should it be and at whose expense
will it be produced?"); Marjorie A. McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the
Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 239,
268, 274 (1990) ("Clinicians believe they are excluded from full participation in their
schools .... A majority of clinicians surveyed rate the attitude of other faculty toward
their work as the major challenge posed by their job. They do not consider themselves
as having full faculty status within their institutions."); Scott Turow, Law School v.
Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 52, 71-72 (noting that the
words "practice" and "practice skills" are often associated by law professors with a form
of roving anti-intellectualism); see also Stephen Wizner, What is a Law School?, 38
EMORY L.J. 701, 713 (1989):
The goal of clinical legal education-and it should be the goal of legal
education-is to teach students to be lawyers, not just to "think like lawyers"
or "act" like lawyers. This means that we must teach law students-provide
a setting in which they can learn-the proper and effective representation of
clients ....
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problems in non-adversarial settings, a less sophisticated activity than
pondering the complexities of appellate advocacy and decision making?
Advocates of lawyering theory find good reason to respect the study
and teaching of appellate court decisions as well as other non-appellate
lawyering practices. Indeed, I suggest that the meaning-making
("constructivist") analysis that I have been discussing not only expands the
ways in which we understand what is going on in judicial opinions, but it
also widens the focus of scholarly interest to include the kinds of out-of-
the-courtroom lawyering activities described above. Put differently,
lawyering theory asks us not only to consider conventional sources of law
such as courts and legislatures, but also how law gets made, and how legal
ideology may be maintained or altered, in such quotidian lawyering
activities as drafting a complaint, taking a deposition, setting up a
corporation, or otherwise helping a client arrange a transaction so as to
take advantage of the existing legal framework." In this view,
exploring how lawyers think and talk in discrete, concrete contexts opens
up a whole new batch of significant and perplexing questions well worth
pursuing both in law school and in scholarly research.
We may now also begin to focus as never before on the lay
participant's role in the legal system. For example, do we know enough
about the lay client's response to how a particular problem is being
addressed through law? Is the client's sense of reality and personal need
being adequately translated into the discourse of law?10' Do different
client groups have different perceptions about how the law is responding
or failing to respond to their respective needs and desires? How do
attorneys understand what a particular client's "problem" is? What "facts"
do attorneys perceive or seek to obtain, and what "facts" escape them? Do
some client groups bear information, perspectives, theories, or beliefs
about their situation that typically are ignored by professionals?
A shift in our thinking about what the law is and where it takes place
can lead to other queries as well. For example, how do we know from
studying a particular Supreme Court decision, say, what is going to
happen in society as a result? How do we know that the decision has been
effectively assimilated in the practices of particular individuals at the local
level and in the practices of other judges, legislators, or administrators
100. See Gordon, supra note 29, at 72, 109-10.
101. See, e.g., JAMESB. WHITE, ON JUSTICEAs TRANSLATIoN20-21, 260-61,269
(1990) (questioning whether lawyers can find a wider range of voices and offer a wider
range to others and arguing for "recognition of the equal value of each person as a center
of worth and meaning"); Christopher Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical
Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINOs L.J. 861,
883 (1992) (asserting that "universalized legal narratives of victim, work, and family
impede and constrain the stories that can be heard in legal fora").
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who are charged with the task of (re-)interpreting what the High Court has
said? Are lawyers giving their clients different advice? Do some people
at the local level discern new entitlements, which prompt new legal actions
in their pursuit?"°2 Or, do some feel that they have lost something and
are consequently persuaded to rechannel their responses to a particular
social conflict along extrajudicial lines-whether through self-help,
political action, or some other course?
In sum, once we begin to focus more of our attention on what lawyers
and clients, judges and bureaucrats, among others, think and say in the
course of their respective activities within the legal culture, we are
increasingly likely to appreciate what their language can tell us about how
law in its everyday actions constructs meaning and reality."es While
undoubtedly useful in this regard, the study of appellate case law alone
clearly will not suffice for us to obtain such an expanded knowledge and
understanding of what the law is and how it operates in practice.)'
Indeed, once we recognize the importance of studying law through
everyday legal practices, from first client contacts to appellate advocacy
and decision making, it becomes increasingly evident that we must also
assess the social context in which these diverse rhetorical activities go on.
For whether we are dealing with the skill of identifying an "apt" analogy
to extant case law, carving out exceptions, spotting new trends in the law,
or engaging in a myriad of other "lawyering tasks," various and
complexly interrelated cultural models will be called into play. Without
studying what those underlying models are, how they operate in specific
situations, and how they shape the way people see, feel, think, and talk
about particular social realities and human activities, none of these skills
will attain a level of sophistication that may otherwise be available. Taking
up a cultural view of law thus asks lawyers and legal scholars specifically
to consider how each of the lawyering skills noted above are being-or
can be-used to construct specific meanings and realities in particular
concrete contexts. Lacking that, we will not be able to tell with confidence
what a particular "law case" is really about or what the meaning and
social significance of a court's subsequent adjudication of that case are.
Put simply, from a study of court cases alone, we will not adequately
learn the meaning and significance even of court cases.
By virtue of what has been said so far, I hope to have been able to
suggest that building upon traditional appellate case-oriented skills with
102. See Marc Galanter, The Life and Tanes of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts
Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 921.
103. See, e.g., Lakoff & Kovecses, supra note 71, at 221 (claiming that linguistic
evidence is an extraordinarily precise guide to the structure of cultural models).
104. See, e.g., MeDiarmid, supra note 99, at 240 (noting that, "[a]t best, fewer
than 1% of legal matters arrive at the doors of the appellate courts").
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skills that reflect other role- and discourse-specific aspects of lawyering,
in all of its phases, is a natural consequence of adopting lawyering
theory's cultural view of the law and its practices. When we realize just
how much law making goes on every day at the local level-where
documents are being drafted and signed, where various strategies are
being considered and implemented, and so on-it becomes apparent that
more knowledge about these activities is essential to an adequate
understanding of what the law is and how it operates in society. The
importance of such knowledge goes beyond helping lawyers and law
teachers improve upon what they do-for example, through the
development of critical studies of lawyering activities at the local level. In
a more general sense, cultivating this kind of knowledge adds to our
understanding of what the law means to academics, practitioners, judges,
and the public.
Some of this work has already begun."° Among the early
pathbreaking studies of how case law gets framed by the ways in which
judges think and talk about the law are H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor6's
study of causation in the law"° and George Fletcher's study of the
transformation of larceny. °" Hart and Honor6 began with the seemingly
simple claim that judges often apply common-sense notions of causation
in determining responsibility. Upon subsequent critical examination of this
claim, Hart and Honor6 discovered that what passes for plain common
sense in the cases masks a complex network of concepts that are latent in
ordinary causal language. The concept of "conditions" versus that of"cause and effect," the concepts of "inducing" or "enticing" others to act,
and the concept of "providing an opportunity" are examples of this. In
short, common sense turns out to be far from a simple thing.
In his study of larceny, Fletcher also took common sense as a point
of departure. He discovered that the early common-law cases relied upon
common sense to identify what a thief looks like and what kind of
behavior warrants blaming. Fletcher went on to show that the "drive for
consistency" in the law has resulted in the abandonment of common sense
for the sake of a more unified law of theft offenses. The new
systemization of the law in this area was made possible, according to
Fletcher, by substituting a legislative-policy science-approach, based on
105. Time, space, and constraints upon my own knowledge limit the examples I can
cite of various aspects of the cultural view that lawyering theory adopts. No doubt traces
of a legal-constructivist approach can be found across a broad spectrum of legal topics.
My intention here is simply to illustrate that this kind of scholarship has already begun
to take shape. For other examples of the newly emerging "cultural studies" genre in the
legal literature, see supra note 69.
106. See H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
107. See Fletcher, supra note 29, at 469.
[Vol. 37
92]LWERING 77EORY OVERVIEW
the unifying concept of intent, for a common-sense recognition of
criminality. In this way, a collective social image of wrongdoing is
replaced by a general theory of property interests. Under the sway of
utilitarian reformers like Bentham and Beccaria, the law has come to
reflect an instrumental concern with the maximization of human happiness.
Specifically, this has meant redesigning the law so that individuals who
might pose a threat to protected interests, like property rights, would be
persuaded that the costs of punishment outweigh the gains of criminal
activity. On this basis, a "rational" system of deterrence could replace the
previous impetus for punishment, namely, the shared sense that a
disturbing event-a breach of the peace-had occurred.
In my own study of the development of the law of confessions,108
I too have found a shift from law talk based on the folk models embodied
in ordinary common sense to an increasingly uniform policy-based
instrumentalism. From conflicting common-sense impressions in the case
law about whether a criminal defendant's statements to police after arrest
are credible, the courts have increasingly moved into the genre of
deterrence talk. As a result, maximizing society's interest in controlling
crime has replaced the common-sense concern for when someone is or is
not likely to be telling the truth. In my study, as in Fletcher's, we see how
a shift in the genre and canons of legal discourse results in different
pictures of reality, different stories about the events and individuals
concerned, as well as different standards for assessing the meaning of
what has happened. For example, whether the actors in question are
viewed as rational calculators facing the quantifiable consequences of an
applicable social policy (such as crime control through deterrence), or
whether their actions are to be assessed on the basis of local contexts (i.e.,
how people can be expected to behave under certain circumstances and
what that behavior means in light of those circumstances), depends upon
the discursive form (or genre) in which their story is officially (i.e.,"authoritatively") framed.
This insight regarding the constitutive power of discourse has also
been noted in other areas of the law. For example, in the area of child-
custody decision making Martha Fineman has shown how the discourse of
the helping professions (i.e., the therapeutic talk of social workers) has
displaced legal models of discourse in resolving custody disputes. 109 In
a broader context, Donald McCloskey has shown how the discourse of
economics, playing upon the dominant belief in-and consequent prestige
of-the genre and canons of science, has managed to disguise its own
rhetorical constructions and present itself as a reliable, stabilizing way of
108. See Sherwin, supra note 10, at 773.
109. See Fineman, supra note 39, at 727.
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thinking and talking about legal matters."' Taking McCloskey's point
a step further, James Boyd White has invited judges, lawyers, and law
teachers to consider law talk in all its forms as "constitutive.""'
According to White, the way we talk about individual identity and social
roles, as well as substantive issues in the law, constructs a discrete world
of meaning. In this view, by virtue of our choice of discourse, we share
responsibility for the way things are.
Of course, the weight of responsibility in this matter increases in
proportion to one's authority to impose or deny one form of discourse
rather than another within the official channels of decision making.
Viewed in a broader social context, then, increased awareness of the
consequences of discrete rhetorical choices draws our attention to those
particular forms of discourse that are culturally dominant, whose use more
readily captures an official decision-maker's beliefs about the way the
world is and what individual actions and events mean. Consider in this
regard John Conley and William O'Barr's recent study of discourse
patterns among claimants in small claims court.112 Their study suggests
that choosing one way of telling one's story in court as opposed to another
(speaking informally and contextually, say, rather than in a formalistic,
rule-based manner) may devastate one's chances of success. Trial lawyers
seem to have picked up this lesson.1  For example, John Griffiths'
and, in a separate study, Austin Sarat and William Felstiner," 5 have
shown how lawyers constructed the identity of their clients in divorce
cases and retold their clients' stories in a way that reflected and facilitated
the attorney's sense of legal reality.11 6 Even more poignantly, Gerald
110. See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric ofLaw and Economics, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 752, 754 (1988).
111. See JAMES B.WHrrE, HERACLES' Bow 37-39 (1985).
112. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 7, at ix.
113. With what degree of consciousness as to their choice of discourse and with
what knowledge of the consequences of that choice, I cannot tell. In any event, a related
concern here is whether the trial attorney's goal (victory in court) need always take
priority over her concern that the client's voice be heard at all. This has become an issue
of some controversy. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Cliet Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991) (describing how
poverty lawyers misconstruct client stories). But see Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work,
and Patience, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 853, 855 (1992) (contending that Professor Alfieri
unwittingly displays a form of client disempowermentby imposing the dictates of abstract
theory).
114. See John Griffiths, What Do Dutch LauyersActually Do In Divorce Cases? 20
LAW & Soc'y REv. 135, 160 (1986).
115. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 69, at 116-17.
116. See also DAvID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 11-13,
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Torres has described how differences in the way that members of the
Mashpee Native American community told the story of their history as a
nation and a culture, and the "official" version of that story as told by the
courts resulted in the Mashpee's failure to gain official recognition as an
independent people. 7
This last illustration of the momentous legal consequences that may
flow from the way people (in positions of power or supplication) tell their
own or another's stories, points up an affinity among those who are now
seeking to explore more fully than before the ways in which legal
meanings are constructed in everyday legal practices, and others who are
beginning to examine the nature of legal storytelling for its own
sake,"' from the standpoint of critical race theory,'19  legal
feminism," ° or clinical law studies." This affinity should not be
surprising. If dominant modes of discourse give rise to worlds of meaning
that reflect the cultural or subcultural reality of a particular discursive
community, those who find themselves located outside the dominant
community may similarly find themselves closed out of the dominant
language of power.'"
45 (1984).
117. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 630 (1990):
The central problem addressed by this essay is whether the limitations of the
legal idiom permit one party to truly inform the other, or conversely, whether
the dimension of power hidden in the idiomatic structure of legal storytelling
forecloses one version in favor of another .... The law does not permit the
Mashpee's story to be particularized and still be legally intelligible .... Mhe
inability of the law to hear, or equally to weigh, culturally divergent versions
of "the truth" should be examined to help us understand how social knowledge
is constructed.
Id. _
118. See Symposium, supra note 86.
119. See DEmcK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAvED 271 (1987); David Hall, The
Constitution andRace: A Critical Perspective, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 229 (1988);
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
120. See Patterson, supra note 9, at 278 (discussing postmodernist insight regarding
the constructed aspect of self and gender); see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOm, THE SECOND
SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley trans., 1953); JuDrrH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 4 (1990).
121. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing A Clinical Perspective
on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 720 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A
Theory-Practice Spiraf" The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1599, 1642 (1991).
122. Viewing the issue of law's legitimation as a matter of heterogeneous versus
shared or mutually acceptable narratives of self and social reality reflects one way in
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B. Lawyering Theory: Point and Counterpoint
Before concluding this overview, it may be helpful to anticipate
objections to a lawyering-theory approach and to provide a few brief
responses. I shall note four possible grounds for criticism.
First, consider the charge of relativism: "You lawyering-heory people
put these different ways of meaning making before us and say different
discourses make up different worlds. But then you leave all these different
narratives on an equal footing. It is as if one world were as good as any
other." That is not so. To acknowledge that there are no absolute truths
good for all places ,at all times does not mean that all values are
consequently co-equal. As Jerome Bruner has noted, values are
"communal and consequential in terms of our relations to a cultural
community. They fulfill functions for us in that community." 1"
Lawyering theory seeks to unfold from everyday practices the local
knowledge and operative beliefs that frame the participants' understanding
of what is going on. The knowledge comes first; possible bases for
critique come after. The choice of how best to think and talk about
resolving social conflicts is not mooted by such knowledge. To the
contrary, by enhancing our awareness of how we "come to our
knowledge," how we know what we know, and what the reality-making
ramifications of that knowledge are, lawyering theory enhances our sense
of responsibility for choosing one discursive practice rather than another
as a suitable means for discerning and resolving conflicts.
"Perhaps so," critics may respond. "But that raises a second
charge-call it the charge of laissez-faireism. You lawyering-theory people
'unfold local knowledge and beliefs,' as you put it, only to leave things
exactly as they are. If local beliefs 'fulfill a function in the community,'
doesn't that mean 'so just leave them alone?' Are you not simply
glorifying the status quo?" No, this charge misconstrues the lawyering-
theory project. As conceived here, that project seeks neither to glorify or
condemn. It seeks to add to our knowledge of the legal culture by offering
new ways of thinking and talking about the law and its practices. Of
course, lawyering studies are likely to uncover legal practices that are well
rooted in local community beliefs. But, if past experience is any guide, it
is no less likely that critics will subsequently come forward to challenge
those beliefs. In any event, if upon closer study a local "prejudice""
which a lawyering-theory approach might affect the way we think and talk about the rule
of law.
123. BRUNER, supra note 5, at 29.
124. See GADAMER, supra note 4, at 239 (regarding the non-pejorative sense of
"prejudice," Gadamer notes that "the recognition that all understanding inevitably
involves some prejudice" is "what gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust").
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emerges from the preconscious domain of habituated thought and practice
into the light of critical reflection, this visibility is likely to provide a
useful opportunity for public deliberation and conscious choice. It is
impossible to say in advance of such discussions what changes they may
inspire-or whether they may ultimately solidify, perhaps on new grounds,
existing beliefs and practices."a
"Well perhaps," critics may respond. "But your response fails to
address a third charge, and it is this: You lawyering-theory people are
playing with fire. Your way of exploring different narrative 'genres' and'canons' in local practice, as you quaintly put it, threatens to undercut the
stability of the legal culture. By unfolding a multiplicity of
incommensurable discourse practices at the local level you contribute to
an already pervasive sense of cultural fragmentation. Surely what we don't
need now is more knowledge about our differences." But that charge, too,
falls wide of the mark. To begin with, before we undertake more studies
at the local level it is premature to conclude that an increased sense of our
differences lies in store for us. Indeed, it may well turn out, as some
studies have begun to suggest, that there is greater commonality among
practicing lawyers and other participants in the legal system than was
previously thought. Perhaps there is more reason to appreciate the efficacy
of our communication and conflict-resolution (or avoidance) practices than
we have been giving ourselves credit for of late. In this respect, lawyering
theory may ultimately lead to a stronger sense of shared community, not
a weaker one, as opponents (without empirical support) may suppose."
Gadamer also notes that it is "the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to the
language that speaks to us in tradition." Id.
125. Consider, for example, Ernest J. Weinrib's suggestion that we should anchor
tort law not in the instrumentalist, goal-oriented analysis relied upon by numerous jurists
committed to a law and economics approach, but rather in "the coherence of its own
interior structure." See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv.
485, 525 (1989):
Central to this article is the distinction between conventional and intrinsic
ordering. These two forms of ordering are, literally, rival syntaxes, two
different ways of arranging-in-association (syn-taxis) the elements of tort law.
Whereas intrinsic ordering treats those elements as the mutually illuminating
bearers of a coherent meaning [Weinrib's view], conventional ordering [such
as Richard Posner's economic analysis] makes tort law a normative gibberish
in which the components of the discourse, when combined, lose whatever
sense they have.
Id. Weinrib finds support for the "intrinsic" approach "in an intellectual tradition that
stretches from Aristotle's account ofjustice to Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of right."
Id. at 526.
126. Of course, to the extent that the existence of a "shared" community means that
differences are lost (blended into the whole) or denied (by the conventional majority),
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But even were we to discern certain disparities in our discourse practices
at the local level, surely this is better than simply pretending that they do
not exist. The latter practice not only ensures that no effective response
to existing disparities will be developed (for without a problem, there is
nothing to solve). Even more objectionably, turning a blind eye to local
disparities (to the extent they exist) disparages belief in the democratic
process of open and candid debate. Put simply, there is a disturbingly
patronizing quality to the charge that we are better off not knowing certain
things about our situation. Who determines what is to be known and
openly discussed, and what must be kept under wraps? There is too much
of the "professional guardians of the people" in this charge.
"Perhaps," opponents may reply. "But your response raises a fourth
charge. You lawyering-theory people threaten us with a new populism.
You covet local knowledge at the expense of sophisticated theory and
expert analyses of the legal system. Surely what we don't need now is a
new 'no-nothing' 'nativism.'" But, again, such a charge is misplaced. It
is not for the sake of displacing expertise that lawyering theory advocates
sensitivity to lay participants' knowledge, beliefs, and understanding
regarding a particular situation. Rather, the point of increasing sensitivity
to ordinary ("non-specialized") points of view is precisely to enhance
professional (academic and practitioner) analysis and to improve the
communication skills that lie at the heart of the lawyering process.
Increased sensitivity to how meanings unfold in language and how
different styles of discourse shape reality in different ways in different
contexts serves not only to increase our knowledge of what is going on
within the legal field, but it also conduces to a more sophisticated
understanding of how best to convey meanings within the various idioms
and narrative structures that make up the legal culture."z
Let us turn now from this brief excursus in point and counterpoint to
some closing reflections on what might lie ahead.
use of the phrase "shared community"-or perhaps the concept itself-may be
questioned. See Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist
Ideal and the Hope of Pluralist Justice, 75 MINN. L. REv. 993, 1006 (1991) ("There
must be strong democratic support for group difference and, from those differences,
complex equalities.").
127. Correlatively, to the extent that a given community invests exclusive authority
in a particular intellectual source and a concomitant discourse form, lawyering theory
may sound a cautionary note. Enhancing sensitivity to diverse modes of reality- and
meaning-construction alerts us to the cognitive and perceptual limitations or "out-group"
exclusions from which a particular authority inevitably suffers. Thus, for exmirple,
exclusive reliance on abstract conceptualization-whether bent on utilitarian calculation
or deontological theory-becomes suspect.
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IV. A PROGRAM FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
Lawyering theory is only just beginning to take shape within the legal
culture. It is too soon to come to any firm conclusions about the nature
and fate of this new way of thinking and talking about law. Much more
work needs to be done. So, in lieu of a conclusion, I want to suggest a
program for future research and innovation. As a result of such efforts,
we will be in a better position to assess lawyering 'theory's potential
contribution to our understanding of law and its practices.
First, we need more local studies of how participants in particular
areas of the law think and talk about what is going on. What patterns of
meaning may be discerned? Are there common scripts, schemas, models,
metaphors, or prototypical worlds that actors bring to their situation? What
makes up their expectations about how to define, and resolve, a "legal"
problem? Whether broader theories may be built up from such studies
must await the outcome of this localized research. In the mean time, law
schools should be encouraged to look upon their clinics as a potential
source of research data for this kind of work. Moreover, this data should
be organized on an intramural basis, within particular clinical settings as
well as in the form of interacademic networking, so that our collective
knowledge of discrete topics of research can be built up by a coordinated
(national and even international) research effort.
Second, additional links should be forged between academia and the
domain of legal practice. Lawyers, judges, and administrators, among
others within the profession, should be apprised of the research efforts
under way and be invited to join in. In this way, not only may researchers
gain a valuable resource,"rs but in addition, those who participate from
outside academia are likely to gain an opportunity to learn more about
their own practices. The business of learning and teaching may thus
achieve a level of mutual scholar/practitioner reinforcement that can help
to reintegrate a now seriously fragmented legal culture.
Third, new efforts should be made to bring the public into the
conversation. We need more studies on how lay people think and talk
about what is going on in the legal field. For example, are there serious
disparities between the profession's sense of justice, of what constitutes
conflict "resolution," and the public's sense of these things? Is the law
adequately serving clients' needs? Is the law serving client's needs in some
areas more than others? Does the law in some areas deter or otherwise
128. See, e.g., Lazes, supra note 98 (discussing "participatory action research" and
how to reconstruct labor-management discourse); see also WHITE, supra note 111, at
855 (describing "reconstructed" theory as a "collective practice" of "ongoing
conversational reflection about how to describe problems, make alliances, devise
strategies").
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discourage the lay public's reliance upon the legal system as a viable
problem-solving mechanism? I believe these and other matters are not
simply of local concern. The continued legitimacy of the legal system
depends upon a broad-based understanding and active public acceptance
of law and its practices. 1" Accordingly, we need to establish a
mechanism by which members of the legal profession can gauge the
public's mood and understanding of what is going on in the law. This
effort from within the profession, when it is perceived by those outside,
is not only likely to contribute to legitimation maintenance; it is also the
kind of communication that legal professionals owe to the public the
system is designed to serve.
Fourth, concrete efforts should be made to reconstruct traditional law
teaching methods to more adequately reflect the changes that have
occurred in our legal culture. For example, applying a lawyering-theory
approach may help to overcome the unproductive and unnecessary
divisions that now separate clinical and "lawyering skills" courses on the
one hand, and so-called "doctrinal" courses on the other. Lawyering
theory can enhance students' appreciation of what a law case is by
encouraging closer examination of how a case gets started (or how it
doesn't) and how it is routed through (or moved outside of) the
adjudicatory process. Case talk could also be expanded to include analyses
of narrative construction. For example, additional consideration might be
given to the operative genres (or discourse types) and canons (or sources
of authority) that explain and justify a particular judicial outcome in a
given case. Students might also be invited to attend more closely to the
constitutive consequences of telling the parties' story in one way as
opposed to another. Of relevance here is an added concern for the kind of
self and social reality that one helps to construct when one narrates the
legal world. As the articles that follow show, such narration draws upon
the persuasive power of a broad array of cognitive and cultural tools.
These are the tools of legal meaning.
Developing further the kinds of research studies, innovations, and
concerns suggested above may have the potential to take us past, or at
least reduce, the divisiveness and tensions that have for too long been
129. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-15 (1992) (upholding
the authority of Roe v. Wade, 413 U.S. 113 (1973), and observing that "legitimacy
depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation. . . . [ie
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy... ."); see also Richard K.
Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 388, 439
(1991) ("The ultimate security of the social order depends upon more than the use of the
state's police power. Of even greater importance is a broad and active commitment, by
officials and citizens alike, to shared basic principles of government.").
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hectoring legal academia from within and straining its relationship with
judges, practitioners, and the public at large. Whether a new flowering of
legal culture1" may lie ahead no one can say. That possibility, however,
cannot be ruled out. It will depend upon our frame of mind.
130. Perhaps akin to the prominent cultural standing that law once attained in
America-at least according to the stories de Tocqueville and Robert Ferguson have told.
See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA 272-79 (1945); FERGUSON,
supra note 45, at 272-80.
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